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I. INTRODUCTION
The history of moral philosophy can be divided roughly into two
distinct, warring camps: deontologists and consequentialists.
Deontologists, or nonconsequentialists, judge the morality of an
action by assessing its intrinsic worth instead of focusing on the
consequences of the action.1 Perhaps, deontological thought is
epitomized at its most glorious extreme by this maxim: “Do what
is right though it results in the demise of the world.”2
* Associate Professor, Texas Tech University, School of Law; J.D., Harvard Law
School, cum laude, 1996; B.A., University of Maryland, summa cum laude, 1992. The
author would like to acknowledge Professor George P. Fletcher for inspiring this Article
with his insightful and historic article, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L.
REV. 537 (1972).
1. MANUEL VELASQUEZ & VINCENT BARRY, PHILOSOPHY: A TEXT WITH READINGS 316
(3d ed. 1988).
2. This famous proclamation paraphrases an even older Roman maxim, fiat justitia
ruat caelum, let there be justice though the heavens fall. RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER’S
UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1998). Although it is often attributed to Immanuel Kant,
its origin is unknown.
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Consequentialists, on the other hand, judge the morality of action by
evaluating results. Utilitarianism, the dominant consequentialist
theory, views the morally just act as the one that creates the greatest
good for the greatest number.3 These, of course, are oversimplified
but useful generalizations.
In their purest form, these moral philosophies are like show dogs.
In the theoretical arena, where their proponents run them through
their carefully scripted hypotheticals, they seem majestic, confident,
and perfect. However, removed from their controlled surroundings
and placed into the world where so many factors collide or are
unknown, their rigidity too often subjects them to crippling flaws.
Deontology’s demand to “do what is right” may resonate deeply, but
there is seldom agreement on what is the right thing to do.4
Moreover, it is hard to ignore consequences when the heavens really
might fall.5 Similarly, utilitarianism’s focus on maximizing the
collective welfare seems reasonable until one’s personal welfare is
sacrificed for the “greater good.”6 Under the appropriate
circumstances, each philosophy is a pleasure to behold, but day-today they demand too much to be ideal companions.
The law, on the other hand, is a mutt. While the supporters of
these conflicting philosophies tend to adhere rigidly to the moral
superiority of their ethic, the law has bred these philosophies
together to derive the best qualities of each. The law must function in
the all too uncertain world where the variables are innumerable, the
facts often are incomplete or conflicting, and the events and parties
are real. Individual rights are balanced against the demands of social
welfare. This balancing can be seen in all fields of law.7 In
constitutional law, the Bill of Rights protects certain fundamental
rights against the demands of social utility.8 Yet even the First
3. VELASQUEZ & BARRY, supra note 1.
4. Leonard G. Ratner, The Utilitarian Imperative: Autonomy, Reciprocity, and
Evolution, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 723, 778 (1984) (arguing that there is no nonutilitarian
basis for choosing between the various a priori moral standards, the proponents of which
claim each to be superior to the other).
5. This problem perhaps most clearly arises in the application of deontological
ethics to the targeting of civilian populations as part of our nuclear deterrence policy. See,
e.g., Paul Ramsey, A Political Ethics Context for Strategic Thinking, in STRATEGIC
THINKING AND ITS MORAL IMPLICATIONS 101, 134-35 (Morton A. Kaplan ed., 1973); MICHAEL
WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
269-83 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J.
LEGAL STUD. 103, 116-18 (1979) (discussing utilitarianism’s propensity to sacrifice
innocent persons for social welfare).
7. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Rights, Fairness, and Choice of Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1277
(1989) (providing a detailed discussion of the rise and dominance of consequentialist
thought in legal jurisprudence and proposing a rights-based approach to choice of law
analysis to constrain, rather than replace, utilitarian policy-based analysis).
8. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 765 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting))
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Amendment’s protection of the individual’s right to free speech is
subject to limitations where a “compelling interest” or “clear and
present danger” threaten the collective good.9 Contract law protects
the right to have private agreements enforced. This right, however, is
typically limited to money damages rather than specific performance
in order to encourage socially desirable contractual breaches that
maximize economic efficiency.10 In property law, restrictive covenants,
such as those that limit land use to single family dwellings, might be
unenforceable when contrary to utilitarian demands of public
policy.11 This balancing is so fundamental to all fields that the law
itself is appropriately symbolized by the scales of justice.
Tort law also has been shaped by the struggle to strike a proper
balance between protecting individual rights and furthering social
utility.12 In his celebrated 1972 Harvard Law Review article, Fairness
(stating that substantive due process analysis involves balancing the liberty interest of the
individual “and the demands of organized society”); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891,
900 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (noting that the Fourth Amendment prohibition
against “unreasonable searches and seizures” requires “balanc[ing] the rights of the
individual with the needs of society”); JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND
THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 223 (1979); see also T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943 (1987) (providing a detailed
critical analysis of the prevalence of balancing rights with utility in constitutional law and
a discussion of alternatives).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(holding that content-based state restrictions on speech “must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest”); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52
(1919) (finding that the First Amendment does not protect speech that creates “a clear and
present danger [of bringing] about substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent”);
see also Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725 (1998) (arguing that actual
constitutional practice reveals that constitutional rights do not typically trump social
welfare concerns); Frederick Schauer, Commensurability and Its Constitutional
Consequences, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 785, 797 (1994).
10. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §12.3 (Aspen
3d ed. 2004) (discussing the economic theory supporting efficient breach of contract where
the party in breach gains more from breaching the contract than she would from full
performance, even after compensating the nonbreaching party for the damages resulting
from the breach); see also Patton v. Mid-Continent Sys., Inc., 841 F.2d 742, 750-51 (7th Cir.
1988) (describing and applying efficient breach of contract theory).
11. See, e.g., Crane Neck Ass’n v. N.Y.C./Long Island Cnty. Servs. Grp., 460 N.E.2d
1336, 1339 (N.Y. 1984).
12. See generally Gregory C. Keating, The Theory of Enterprise Liability and Common
Law Strict Liability, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1285 (2001) [hereinafter Keating, Theory]
(describing the common law of torts as torn between fault, enterprise liability, and other
norms like property rights); Edward C. Lyons, Balancing Acts: Intending Good and
Foreseeing Harm—The Principle of Double Effect in the Law of Negligence, 3 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 453 (2005) (discussing the task of balancing the often antithetical
considerations of rights and utility in negligence law); M. Stuart Madden, Selected Federal
Tort Reform and Restatement Proposals Through the Lenses of Corrective Justice and
Efficiency, 32 GA. L. REV. 1017 (1998) (discussing the balancing of corrective justice and
economic efficiency goals in proposed products liability reform legislation and the Third
Restatement’s treatment of warning defects); David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of
Products Liability Law: Toward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 434 (1993)
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and Utility in Tort Theory, Professor George P. Fletcher describes
this struggle as a “confrontation . . . between two radically different
paradigms,” one that focuses solely on doing justice between the
parties, and another that seeks to resolve private disputes in ways
that best serve the collective good.13 Fletcher dubs the rights-based
fairness model “the paradigm of reciprocity”14 and names the competing
utilitarian model “the paradigm of reasonableness.”15 The paradigm
of reciprocity emphasizes individual autonomy, and the paradigm of
reasonableness emphasizes efficiency and community welfare.
Fletcher’s article is not simply a description of the clash between
fairness and utility in tort theory; it is fueled by a deep opposition to
utilitarianism’s propensity to demand individual sacrifice for the
greater good.16 The unfairness of the reasonableness paradigm,
according to Fletcher, is that it weighs the collective costs and
benefits of an activity to society as a whole, without regard to the
disproportionate distribution of the cost to the victim.17 The
reasonableness paradigm allows individuals to be used as the means
to achieving a socially beneficial end. Fletcher believes that the
paradigm of reciprocity could serve as a descriptively and morally
superior unifying theory of torts. While Fletcher’s article has grown
in fame over the years and continues to be widely read and
referenced,18 his paradigm of reciprocity has not been embraced as a
unifying theory of tort law. Only rarely has it been applied by the
[hereinafter Owen, Foundations] (arguing that products liability law cannot, and should
not, be reduced to a single unifying “metatheory” but instead requires a pluralist analysis
from a variety of moral perspectives).
13. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537,
539-40 (1972) [hereinafter Fletcher, Fairness and Utility].
14. Id. at 540; see also Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademification of
Tort Theory, 48 KAN. L. REV. 59, 79 n.162 (1999) (citing Lawrence Vold et al., Aircraft
Operator’s Liability for Ground Damage and Passenger Injury, 13 NEBR. L. BULL. 373, 380
(1935); Wex Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 U. ILL. L. REV. 151,
156-57 (1946) (discussing Lawrence Vold's theory)) (noting that the concept of reciprocity of
risk as a fundamental basis of tort theory did not originate with Fletcher’s work but was
widely discussed in prior scholarship in the 1930s and 1940s).
15. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 542.
16. See id. Fletcher’s application of deontological philosophy to the law is not limited
to torts theory. In fact, Fletcher is more renowned for his influential and voluminous
scholarship in the area of criminal law. Regardless of the field of law, a recurring theme in
much of his work is the search for and commitment to values that are ends in themselves
rather than seeking rules that will achieve some conception of social welfare. See generally
George P. Fletcher, In God’s Image: The Religious Imperative of Equality Under Law, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1608 (1999); George P. Fletcher, The Fall and Rise of Criminal Theory, 1
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 275 (1998); George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98
HARV. L. REV. 949 (1985); George P. Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421 (1987)
[hereinafter Fletcher, Why Kant].
17. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 542-43.
18. See, e.g., Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.KENT L. REV. 751, 769 (1996) (ranking Fletcher’s Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory as the
fifty-seventh most cited legal article of all time).
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courts,19 and with a few notable exceptions, it is conspicuously absent
from products liability scholarship.20 Like Howard Hughes’ Spruce
Goose,21 it is admired for its imagination and scope, but no one seems
confident it will actually fly.22
As with torts generally, products liability has also struggled to
balance individual fairness with social utility.23 Since its approval in
1997, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability (Third
Restatement) has been subject to criticism from both perspectives, but
the loudest voices have been from those who view the Third
Restatement as being too industry friendly at the cost of consumers.24
This Article subjects the Third Restatement to the same
contrasting analysis that Fletcher applied to torts generally in order
to better understand its successes and failures in balancing the
competing goals of fairness and utility. While Fletcher’s article is
used as a template, his paradigm of reciprocity proves to be
unworkable when applied to bargained-for exchanges such as those
19. Of the fourteen published opinions that cite Fletcher’s article, only one claims to
apply notions of reciprocity to the case. See Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655,
662-63 (6th Cir. 1979). The court invoked principles of reciprocity as support for the
proposition that business entities may take advantage of the benefits of dividing the
business into parent and subsidiary corporate parts but must in fairness also be treated as
distinct corporations for purposes of liability and benefits under the workmen's
compensation statute. See id. While the court cited Fletcher’s Fairness and Utility in Tort
Theory, the argument is more akin to estoppel than Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity.
20. See Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 558,
606 (1985) (criticizing Fletcher’s theory for being normatively unattractive and for failing
to explain tort “[c]ases involving preexisting relationships, such as nonnegligent
auto/passenger and doctor/patient injuries”).
21. The “Spruce Goose” is the nickname for the massive, 218 foot-long, plywood sea
plane built by Hughes Aircraft as a prototype transport designed to carry troops and
supplies across the Atlantic Ocean during WWII. Unfortunately, engineering obstacles and
budget overruns prevented its completion until 1947. It flew only once, for about one mile
with Howard Hughes at the controls. Nevertheless, it remains an object of study and
wonderment and can be viewed at the Evergreen Aviation and Space Museum in
McMinniville, Oregon.
22. See Heidi M. Hurd, Nonreciprocal Risk Imposition, Unjust Enrichment, and the
Foundations of Tort Law: A Critical Celebration of George Fletcher’s Theory of Tort Law, 78
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 711, 712 (2003) (criticizing Fletcher’s article as “descriptively
implausible, normatively unattractive, and ultimately conceptually incoherent”). While
much of her criticism has merit, her basic argument depends upon a more dogmatic
interpretation of Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity than he was suggesting. See also
Gregory C. Keating, Reasonableness and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 314-16 (1996) [hereinafter Keating, Reasonableness] (criticizing reciprocity
theory for its failure to explain the law of due care).
23. See Owen, Foundations, supra note 12 (approaching the issues from a variety of
moral perspectives rather than adopting a single metatheory).
24. See generally Rebecca Korzec, Dashing Consumer Hopes: Strict Products Liability
and the Demise of the Consumer Expectations Test, 20 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 227
(1997); Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700 (2003);
Note, Just What You’d Expect: Professor Henderson’s Redesign of Products Liability, 111
HARV. L. REV. 2366, 2381 (1998); Jerry J. Phillips, Consumer Expectations, 53 S.C. L. REV.
1047 (2002); Ellen Wertheimer, The Biter Bit: Unknowable Dangers, the Third Restatement,
and the Reinstatement of Liability Without Fault, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 889 (2005).
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that occur between manufacturers and consumers in products
liability. A modification to that model, herein dubbed the “autonomy
paradigm,” provides a clearer lens through which to view the
Third Restatement.
Part II explains Fletcher’s paradigms of reciprocity and
reasonableness in detail and highlights the ability of each to provide
useful but contrasting views of tort law. Part III discusses the
problems and limitations inherent in the paradigm of reciprocity,
including its inability to account for bargained-for relationships. Its
failure to achieve broader application is attributed to its
unnecessarily narrow conception of liberty and dogmatic disregard
for the demands of utility. The “autonomy paradigm” is proposed as a
modification that retains reciprocity’s goal of protecting equal liberty
but broadens the test of equal freedom to include the express and
implied consent to risks in exchange for express and implied benefits.
The autonomy paradigm also makes modest utilitarian concessions
in order to create a balanced and practical conceptual model that can
be applied to the full range of tort law.
Part IV discusses the evolution of products liability law leading to
the drafting of the Third Restatement. This discussion forms the
basis for the ensuing analysis in Part V, which applies the
contrasting autonomy paradigm and reasonableness paradigm to the
three primary categories of product defects as described in the Third
Restatement: manufacturing, warning, and design defects. The
analysis provides the reader with markedly differing views of the
same legal landscape. In doing so it reveals that in most respects
individual fairness and social utility are balanced by and embodied in
the Third Restatement. This balancing, as in torts generally, is
achieved through the use of several tests based upon distinct
concerns rather than the application of a single mega theory of
liability applied to all cases and claims.
Part VI discusses the one area where fairness is unnecessarily
sacrificed for utility: claims brought by bystanders (strangers to the
product rather than consumers) injured by dangers inherent in useful
product design. Finally, it advances several strict liability proposals
to restore the balance between fairness and utility with regard to
bystanders injured by dangerous but socially useful product designs.
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II. FLETCHER’S PARADIGMS OF RECIPROCITY AND REASONABLENESS
Fletcher’s article mirrors the conflict between rights-based
scholarship25 and economic scholarship that was raging in torts
theory at that time.26 The two paradigms he describes serve as useful
contrasting lenses for viewing the body of tort law from distinct
perspectives. The contrasting view highlights the conflict in tort law
between fairly treating the parties before the court and furthering
collective welfare. His analysis enhances our understanding of the
nature of strict liability and makes us question our fundamental
assumption regarding the requirement of fault for compensation. But
Fletcher does not seek to combine or balance the competing demands
of social utility and individual rights.27 He regards the paradigm of
reciprocity as both normatively and descriptively superior to the
paradigm of reasonableness.28 In the end, however, reciprocity of risks
proves too slender a reed upon which to support tort law as a whole.
A. The Paradigm of Reciprocity
As a deontological model, the paradigm of reciprocity must adhere
to a nonconsequential value that serves as its foundation.29 One of
the historical criticisms of all deontological thought is the subjective
nature of the fundamental values upon which it is based. Whether
the source is religion, natural law, or reason, there is no agreement
on the fundamental values or their origins. To resolve this problem,
Fletcher, like Immanuel Kant,30 John Rawls,31 and many others
before him, identifies individual autonomy—freedom—as the most
fundamental right of all persons.32 Individual liberty allows each
25. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 540.
26. See generally George P. Fletcher, Remembering Gary—and Tort Theory, 50 UCLA
L. REV. 279 (2003). In 1972, Professor George P. Fletcher was at the University of
California School of Law immersed in what he has described as the “headiest hothouse of
ideas” that he has ever known. Id. at 279. In addition to Fletcher, UCLA School of Law was
at that time the home of such tort giants as Gary Schwartz, Richard Epstein, and
philosophers Herbert Morris and Dick Wasserstrom.
27. Id. at 285 (“I implicitly favored the paradigm of reciprocity, but I did not then and
I do not now believe in a synthesis that could resolve the conflict between the thesis of
reciprocity and the antithesis of reasonableness.”).
28. Id.
29. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550.
30. E.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS (Harper &
Row 1964) (1785). At the risk of oversimplifying Kant’s writings, one clear tenet of his work
is that people should always be treated with respect to their dignity as autonomous beings
and always as ends in themselves. This principle is central to Fletcher’s paradigm of
reciprocity. See also Fletcher, Why Kant, supra note 16, at 428 (discussing Kant’s influence
upon legal thought, in particular, the premise that individual rights “ ‘trump’ the demands
of utility and efficiency”).
31. See e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
32. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550.
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person to decide what constitutes a good life and what ends, if any,
are worth pursuing.33
The paradigm of reciprocity was heavily influenced by Rawls’ A
Theory of Justice, which was published the previous year.34 By
analogy to Rawls’ first principle of justice, Fletcher’s paradigm of
reciprocity is premised upon the belief that “all individuals in society
have the right to roughly the same degree of security from risk.”35
Under this model, the collective utility of the activities and the
impact of tort judgments on society are irrelevant.36 A defendant is
liable only for injuries caused by activities that create “risk[s] greater in
degree and different in order” from the risk created by the plaintiff.37
Like Rawls, Fletcher believes that all members of society have the
right to enjoy the maximum liberty compatible with equal liberty for
all.38 The problem is that all freedom of action creates some risks of
harm to others. Harm, particularly physical harm, greatly impairs
one’s freedom. Individual freedom of action is also circumscribed if
one is prevented from acting whenever the action reduces the
security of others. Freedom of action must be balanced against the
right to security from harm. There is no reason, however, to
circumscribe liberty unless it is incompatible with the equal freedom
of others. The dilemma is how to balance liberty with security.
To balance the conflicting demands of freedom and security,
Fletcher insists that one needs to focus only on the conduct of the
parties.39 The paradigm of reciprocity is based upon a model of waiver
or consent.40 Fletcher looks at individual conduct to determine the
level of risk to which that individual has consented.41 Fairness
requires that one waive the right to be secure from risks in equal
measure to the level of risk one’s own conduct imposes on others.42
When, however, the plaintiff is injured by a risk greater in degree
than the risk the plaintiff imposed on the defendant, the plaintiff is

33. See John B. Attanasio, The Principle of Aggregate Autonomy and the Calabresian
Approach to Products Liability, 74 VA. L. REV. 677, 684 (1988) (proposing that autonomy in
the context of tort law has “an intrinsically valuable condition that involves the right to
fashion one’s own life plan”).
34. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550 n.50 (citing John Rawls,
Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164, 165 (1958) and RAWLS, supra note 31). Rawls’ first
principle of justice is that “each person participating in a practice, or affected by it, has an
equal right to the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all.” Id. (quoting
RAWLS, supra note 31, at 165).
35. Id. at 550.
36. Id. at 540-41.
37. Id. at 542.
38. See id. at 550.
39. Id. at 540-41.
40. Id. at 569. Fletcher does not refer to consent but rather the “strategy of waiver.” Id.
41. See id. at 540.
42. Id. at 569.
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entitled to compensation.43 One also consents implicitly to the
“background” level of risk created by common activities, like normal
motor vehicle driving, in which everyone necessarily partakes.44
These risks are, as a class, offsetting reciprocal risks.45 Harms that
result from these reciprocal risks are not compensated because the
right to be free from these risks is waived by participation in the riskcreating activity.46
Fletcher recognized that “[t]he interests of society may often
require a disproportionate distribution of risk.”47 Yet he believes the
tort system’s general limitation of remedies to money damages
sufficiently balances the needs of society with the rights of the
individual without the need for further protection in the test for
liability. The paradigm of reciprocity does not criminalize or enjoin
the socially useful activity but makes the actor pay for injuries that
result from the unbalanced distribution of risks.48
B. The Paradigm of Reasonableness
The paradigm of reasonableness emphasizes efficiency and
community welfare.49 In many respects, it resembles the ordinary
negligence cost-benefit formula50 infused with the law and the
economic principles typified by the scholarship of Richard Posner,
Guido Calabresi, and Ronald Coase.51 Its fundamental premise is
that tort law should encourage activities that maximize benefits to
society as a whole.52 Reasonableness is determined by comparing the
costs and benefits of the injury-causing activity to determine if it
yields a net gain in social utility.53 If the activity’s benefits to society
as a whole outweigh its costs, including any resulting injuries, then
the plaintiff is not entitled to recover.54 Therefore, a defendant is
43. Id. at 542.
44. Id. at 548.
45. Id. at 548.
46. Id. at 569 (“The paradigm of reciprocity, on the other hand, is based on a strategy
of waiver. It takes as its starting point the personal rights of individuals in society to enjoy
roughly the same degree of security, and appeals to the conduct of the victims themselves
to determine the scope of the right to equal security.”).
47. Id. at 550.
48. Id. at 569 (Reciprocity “protect[s] individual autonomy by taxing [in the form of
tort damages], but not prohibiting, socially useful activities.”).
49. Id. at 542.
50. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[I]f the
probability be called P; the injury, L; and the burden, B; liability depends upon whether B
is less than L multiplied by P. . . .”).
51. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970); R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1
(1960); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
52. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 543.
53. Id. at 542.
54. Id.
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liable only for injuries caused by activities that, on balance, create
more harm than benefits.55
The paradigm of reasonableness is perhaps most closely
associated with the risk-utility formula articulated by Learned Hand
in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. In Carroll Towing, a
negligently operated tugboat caused a barge loaded with government
flour to break free of its pier and drift into a tanker, whose propeller
ruptured a hole in the barge bottom, causing the barge to sink.56 In
considering the comparative negligence of the barge owner for failing
to have a bargee on board who could have utilized pumps to save the
vessel, Learned Hand articulated his famous formula.57 Liability is
imposed if the burden of adequate precautions (B) is less than the
gravity of harm (L) multiplied by the probability of harm (P).58 So, for
example, assume that we determine that the precaution of having a
bargee on board would cost $30,000 a year, while a barge breaks free
an average of once a year and causes an average of $20,000 in
damages. In such a case, the defendant would not be liable for failing
to pay more for a precaution than the cost of the foreseeable harm.
Although such precise calculations were not possible,59 the court
concluded that the cost of keeping a bargee on board the barge during
the “haste and bustle” of daylight activity on New York Harbor
during the full tide of war was less than the foreseeable harm likely
to result absent this precaution.60 Accordingly, as a matter of
efficiency, the court concluded that the barge operator was
contributorily negligent for not keeping a bargee on board during
daylight hours.61

55. See id. at 542-43.
56. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 171 (1947).
57. Id. at 173.
58. Id. (expressing the formula mathematically as B < PL); see also Posner, supra note
51, at 32-33. Judge Posner’s explanation of Hand’s formula is now notorious.
59. As Judge Learned Hand noted in his opinion subsequent to his famous formula
from Carroll Towing:
[O]f these factors care is the only one ever susceptible of quantitative estimate,
and often that is not. The injuries are always a variable within limits, which do
not admit of even approximate ascertainment; and, although probability might
theoretically be estimated, if any statistics were available, they never are; and,
besides, probability varies with the severity of the injuries. It follows that all such
attempts are illusory, and, if serviceable at all, are so only to center attention
upon which one of the factors may be determinative in any given situation.
Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).
60. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 174.
61. See id.
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C. The Paradigms Applied to Strict Liability, Negligence, and
Intentional Torts
Fletcher maintains that the contracting paradigm of reciprocity is
a descriptively superior model capable of unifying the seemingly
diverse categories of strict liability, intentional torts, and negligence,
while the paradigm of reasonableness can account only for some
negligence claims.62 For example, the paradigm of reciprocity
accounts for the imposition of strict liability for ultrahazardous
activities like blasting, fumigating, and crop dusting because these
activities create risks greater in degree and different in order
(nonreciprocal) compared to the risks of ordinary activities.63 Under
this model it is irrelevant that these ultrahazardous activities are
socially beneficial or that the risks are justifiable from a utilitymaximizing perspective.64 The sole focus is on the level of risk created
by the defendant and the plaintiff. Thus, when a construction
company’s stock of explosives accidentally detonates and the
concussion injures an adjacent homeowner, liability is imposed
despite the social utility and the exercise of reasonable care.65 The
risk to the adjacent homeowner created by the use and storage of
explosives, while justifiable, is greater than the risks the homeowner
imposes on the construction company. The socially beneficial activity
is not criminalized or enjoined, but the individual’s loss is
compensated.66 On the other hand, the paradigm of reasonableness
cannot account for the imposition of strict liability because even the
high degree of risk associated with these activities can be justified by
the tremendous collective benefits they provide.
When applied to negligence claims, Fletcher’s two paradigms often
result in similar outcomes, but the tests employed and the factors
considered are philosophically distinct. For example, an automobile
accident between two drivers, each following the rules of the road,
would result in no liability under either paradigm.67 Both drivers
impose similar reciprocal risks to the other, and normal driving is
socially beneficial, reasonable, and efficient despite the harms that
result.68 In contrast, when one driver weaves in and out of traffic at
seventy miles per hour, while the other remains in her lane, traveling
62. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 540-50.
63. Id. at 547.
64. Id. at 540-41.
65. See generally Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 511 (1931)
(Plaintiff’s home and business were damaged, and she was thrown from her bed and
injured when defendant’s store of dynamite used in connection with a hydroelectric
development suddenly exploded).
66. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550-51.
67. Id. at 543.
68. Id.
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at the posted speed limit of forty miles per hour, the speeding driver
creates a nonreciprocal risk compared to the other. If their collision
results in an injury proximately caused by the speeding driver, she
will be held liable. The reasonableness paradigm also imposes
liability, but the rationale is that the modest increase in utility that
results from speeding is significantly outweighed by the increased
risk of harm.
Similarly, Fletcher maintains that intentional torts like assault
and battery are aptly explained by the paradigm of reciprocity.69 If a
defendant acts with intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact, or
knows such a contact is substantially certain to result, the ensuing
risk is of a degree and kind entirely distinct from the background of
risks one normally accepts as part of one’s participation in society.70
The reasonableness paradigm also imposes liability for many
intentional torts as long as they do not result in greater social utility.
D. The Unfairness of the Paradigm of Reasonableness
Although Fletcher believes the paradigm of reciprocity is
descriptively superior to the reasonableness paradigm, it is his moral
aversion to the paradigm of reasonableness’s propensity to sacrifice
the “individual to the demands of maximizing utility” that drives him
to embrace the alternative paradigm of reciprocity.71 Under the
reasonableness paradigm, where the injury-causing activity has
sufficient social utility, compensation is denied regardless of the
nonreciprocal nature of the risks imposed. Fletcher cites several
examples illustrating this problem: the streetcar company that
knows its trains will occasionally jump the track; the police officer
who injures a bystander while shooting at a fleeing felon; and the
logger who floats logs downriver despite his knowledge that the
activity might cause flood damage to downstream crops.72 In each
instance, the utility of the injury-causing activity might result in the
plaintiff receiving no compensation for his injury under the paradigm
of reasonableness. Under the paradigm of reciprocity, instead of
being sacrificed, persons injured by these activities would be
compensated because of the nonreciprocal nature of the risk imposed.73
A hypothetical variation of the facts in United States v. Carroll
Towing Co. highlights the normative objection to the paradigm of
reasonableness. Imagine that the plaintiff saves a little each week in
order to purchase a $20,000 powerboat that he keeps tied to a marina
69. Id. at 550.
70. Id. Curiously, Fletcher describes battery as “a rapid acceleration of risk, directed
at a specific victim.” Id.
71. Id. at 573.
72. Id. at 563.
73. Id. at 550-51.
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pier when not in use. The defendant’s barge becomes unmoored and
drifts into the plaintiff’s boat, sending it to the bottom of New York
Harbor. Assume that the court is able to determine with perfect
prescience that the cost of employing sufficient bargees would be
$30,000 annually and that a barge will break free of its mooring once
a year and cause an average of $20,000 in damages to other vessels
or structures. Under the reasonableness paradigm, the burden of
taking adequate precautions would be greater than the probability of
harm multiplied by the gravity of the injury, resulting in no
negligence and no liability. From a utilitarian and efficiency
perspective, it is not reasonable to spend $30,000 in order to prevent
$20,000 in losses.
Conversely, from a fairness perspective, the imposition of liability
under the same facts is required. Utilitarian concerns might well
dictate that the defendant not be criminally sanctioned, enjoined, or
compelled to spend $30,000 to prevent the $20,000 loss.
Nevertheless, it seems unfair that the plaintiff should suffer a loss of
$20,000 in order to save the defendant $30,000. The reciprocity
paradigm leaves the defendant free to choose the more efficient method
of conducting his business but requires that he pay the less expensive
damages caused by the nonreciprocal risks created by his choice.
Hence, the defendant’s choice would be between $30,000 for prevention
or $20,000 in damages, not $30,000 in prevention or nothing.
It is strange that tort law regards it as reasonable to leave the
innocent victims of welfare-maximizing activities uncompensated,74
while criminal law regards the sacrifice of morally innocent
individuals for the good of society as unjust.75 In criminal law,
innocent persons are not to be punished for crimes they did not
commit—even if it can be justified by application of utilitarian
calculations—because innocent persons have a moral right to have
their autonomy respected and not be treated as a means to an end.76
74. See id. at 567.
75. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I view the
requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case as bottomed on a
fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent
man than to let a guilty man go free.”); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*352 (“[B]etter that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer.”); Alexander
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173 (1997) (discussing the historical foundations
and rationale for Blackstone’s famous ten-to-one ratio).
76. See E.F. CARRITT, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (Greenwood Press 1973)
(1947) (Illustrating the potential for utilitarian principles to justify punishment of the
innocent: “[I]f some kind of very cruel crime becomes common, and none of the criminals
can be caught, it might be highly expedient, as an example, to hang an innocent man, if a
charge against him could be so framed that he were universally thought guilty; indeed this
would only fail to be an ideal instance of utilitarian ‘punishment’ because the victim
himself would not have been so likely as a real felon to commit such a crime in the future;
in all other respects it would be perfectly deterrent and therefore felicific.”); see also Ronald
J. Rychlak, Society’s Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation
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Yet if the imposition of criminal sanctions on morally innocent
defendants is deemed an unfair imposition on individual rights, then
the uncompensated imposition of harm on innocent victims of socially
useful activities also must be judged as an unfair, though perhaps
less severe, imposition on individual rights.77
Indeed, in some circumstances, the paradigm of reasonableness
would not compensate victims of even intentional harms as long as
the act results in a net social utility. While Fletcher never discusses
this aspect of the paradigm of reasonableness, the theoretical
potential is illustrated by a variation of the classic trolley dilemma
articulated by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thompson.78 A trolley is
moving down the track towards five people who, for purposes of the
hypothetical, are unaware of its approach and cannot be warned of
the danger. However, one can save these five people by pushing a
large man in front of the trolley, thereby stopping it before it reaches
the other five persons on the track.79 The reasonableness paradigm
would not impose liability because the cost of one life is justified in
order to prevent the loss of five lives. If the unrealities of the problem
are set aside, the dilemma highlights the potential of utilitarian
thought to sacrifice individuals for the collective good.80 The
paradigm of reciprocity, on the other hand, would compel liability for

Theory of Punishment, 65 TUL. L. REV. 299, 324 n.93 (1990) (“If a judge were actually to
follow a utilitarian theory of punishment, the judge might be required to punish a
defendant who was widely believed to be guilty, even if the judge knew the defendant to be
innocent.”); Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory
and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 320 n.11 (1984). But see Guyora
Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarianism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 115, 118-19 (2000) (insisting that claims that utilitarianism could support
the framing of the innocent are based upon a misapplication of an act-utilitarian ethic of
individual behavior to the institutions and process necessarily central to utilitarian
penology). Binder and Smith, however, do not appear to directly refute Carritt’s
hypothetical, but rather dispute the conclusions of the hypothetical when applied to
institutions with a uniform, utility-maximizing process. Id. at 133-35.
77. To highlight the injustice that can result from an exclusive focus on collective
welfare, Fletcher draws an analogy between the paradigm of reasonableness in tort cases
and strict liability in criminal cases. In Commonwealth v. Mash, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 472
(1844), the court upheld a bigamy conviction against a woman who sincerely, but
incorrectly, believed her first husband was dead. Id. at 473. While the court acknowledged
that Mrs. Mash was not blameworthy for her mistake, the conviction was justified by the
need to deter bigamy for the sake of social order. Id. The morally innocent suffers for the
collective good. The reader will be relieved to learn that Mrs. Mash was pardoned by the
Governor before she was sentenced. Id. at 475.
78. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley Problem, 59
MONIST 204 (1976).
79. Id. at 206.
80. But see Ratner, supra note 4, at 752 (suggesting that the “monstrous” potential of
utilitarian theory is eliminated by the incorporation of sociobiological evolution principles
because monstrous conduct is inconsistent with “long-run human survival”).
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imposing this nonreciprocal risk on the unfortunately placed large
man despite the utility of sacrificing him.81
Fletcher recognizes that utilitarian concerns demand that certain
socially beneficial activities be permitted despite the resulting
nonreciprocal risks.82 The problem with the paradigm of
reasonableness is that it seeks to determine whether the defendant
should have engaged in the harm-causing activity instead of another
course of conduct, rather than determining if, in fairness, the
plaintiff should be compensated for his loss.83 An exclusive focus on
the utilitarian calculus might be appropriate if a finding of liability in
ordinary tort claims resulted in the prohibition or criminalization of
conduct that maximizes the collective welfare of society.84 Of course,
tort liability does not result in criminal sanctions, and injunctive
relief is not available except under a few unique circumstances.85
Rather, a finding of liability results in the defendant compensating
the plaintiff for the harm caused by the defendant’s conduct.
Enterprise liability theory dispels concerns that imposing
compensatory damages will have dire consequences on utility.86 If the
defendant’s conduct is efficient, it still costs less to compensate the
plaintiff than it would cost to implement safer practices.87 Moreover,
if no harm results from the defendant’s nonreciprocal risk-creating
activity, tort law is not implicated.88
The paradigm of reciprocity’s requirement that those engaged in
socially useful activities should nonetheless pay for the harms they
81. I suspect Fletcher would insist that the large man cannot be sacrificed to save
the others.
82. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 550.
83. See id. at 556-57.
84. See id. at 568.
85. Injunctive relief is generally available only in instances of ongoing intentional
torts and nuisance claims. See Walsh v. Johnston, 608 A.2d 776 (Me. 1992) (describing an
injunction requiring removal of a portion of cottage encroaching on the owner’s land). Even
when a nuisance is established, injunctive relief may be denied if the activity is socially
useful and the nuisance cannot be abated without effectively closing the defendant’s
business or rendering it economically unfeasible. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257
N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970) (ordering damages rather than injunctive relief where the
defendant’s cement plant produced dust that interfered with the use and enjoyment of
nearby homes where the loss recoverable was small in comparison with the cost of removal
of the nuisance).
86. See, e.g., Keating, Theory, supra note 12 (explaining the rationales for enterprise
liability and criticizing the Restatement (Third) of Torts’ implicit claim that strict liability
is not a general theory of responsibility for accidental physical injury).
87. Id.
88. See Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (awarding nominal
damages for denial of speech rights); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1207-08 &
n.100 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating that damages could be “inferred” from violation of
substantive right to be free from unlawful search), aff’d in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981). At
least with regard to negligence claims, harm is an essential element of the claim. General
harm is required in other tort actions although it is sometimes presumed with regard to
dignitary torts or is not subject to quantification.
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cause is instantly recognizable to those familiar with products
liability theory. Strict products liability is justified, at least in part,
by the notion that product manufacturers should spread the costs of
the harms their products cause among those who benefit from the
use of their products.89 Yet Fletcher’s reciprocity theory is
conspicuously absent from the bulk of products liability theory.90 In
order to understand why the paradigm of reciprocity has not had a
wider practical impact on tort law and on products liability in
particular, it is necessary to expose its limitations and revise the
model to make it applicable to products liability. The goal is to retain
reciprocity’s focus on individual fairness while creating a more
comprehensive and balanced model that can be effectively applied by
the courts.
III. PROBLEMS WITH AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE PARADIGM OF
RECIPROCITY TEST
Two problems with the paradigm of reciprocity have hampered its
real world applications. First, Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity fails
to serve as a comprehensive theory of tort law because it focuses
exclusively on individual autonomy and fails to sufficiently balance
the needs of society. Second, while purporting to be based upon a
waiver of security or consent to risk, the test measures consent only
by risk creation. This test ignores all other express and implicit
exchanges of security for freedom. As a result, the reciprocity
paradigm proves unworkable, unfair, and overly simplistic when
applied to the innumerable real world interactions in which members
of a complex society expressly or impliedly consent to nonreciprocal
risks in exchange for some other perceived benefit.
A. The Utility of Background Risks
Fletcher acknowledges that the paradigm of reciprocity leaves
unresolved certain problems he considers to be at the “fringes” of tort
law.91 But these problems arise at the heart of many tort disputes,

89. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998)
(“Finally, many believe that consumers who benefit from products without suffering harm
should share, through increases in the prices charged for those products, the burden of
unavoidable injury costs that result from manufacturing defects.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965) (“On whatever theory . . . public policy demands
that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products intended for consumption be
placed upon those who market them, and be treated as a cost of production . . . .”); see also
Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1295 (discussing the rationales for enterprise liability);
John E. Montgomery & David G. Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of
Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976).
90. Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 22, at 314 (noting that reciprocity theory has
not been applied to products liability).
91. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 549 n.46.
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rather than at the periphery. Suppose, for example, a motorist
injures a pedestrian. Assuming the pedestrian is also a motorist some
of the time, even if not at the time of injury, how does the paradigm
of reciprocity resolve the pedestrian’s claim? In other words, must the
risks be simultaneous, or can reciprocal risks offset each other as
long as both parties participate in the activity, albeit at different
times? The problems become more complex where the injured party
never participates in the activity that caused his injury. What if a
pedestrian who never drives or rides in motor vehicles is injured by
the driver of a motor vehicle? Does everyone have to engage in the
activity for the risks to be deemed reciprocal or just most of society?92
Fletcher calls this the problem of “protecting minorities.”93
In order to resolve these problem cases, individual freedom must
be balanced with social utility. A solution is suggested by Fletcher’s
discussion of the “background risks” of common activities that
generally impose reciprocal risks on all as a cost of community
living.94 These background risks of community living are, of course, a
reflection of the utilitarian decisions that are made either through
custom or positive law.95 Normal driving includes calculations about
what speeds are reasonable, despite the risks, because of the utility.
There certainly would be more security if everyone drove at slower
speeds, but there would be a concomitant loss of utility and liberty.96
Rather than honor the wishes of those who choose not to participate
or who may have opted for safer but less efficient rules of the road,
the background risks of common activities, like the risk associated
with what might be described as reasonable driving, must be imposed
on all persons. The fairness of exposing others to background risks
seems justified by the direct benefits the nonparticipants receive
from these background risks.97 Indeed, a common understanding of
fair and just interactions with others is largely based upon an innate
92. See id. at 572.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 543. Fletcher does not resolve these problems but does describe certain
common activities, such as ordinary driving, as background risks that we may be expected
to bear without compensation. Id.
95. See id. Fletcher never acknowledges the utilitarian calculus that has led to
common activities or the customs and rules we regard as ordinary driving.
96. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998)
(“Society does not benefit from products that are excessively safe—for example,
automobiles designed with maximum speeds of 20 miles per hour—any more than it
benefits from products that are too risky.”).
97. Of course, after a risk results in harm to the plaintiff, it might seem that the harm
outweighs the benefits the plaintiff received from the background activity that harmed the
plaintiff. However, it is equally true with regard to harms resulting from reciprocal risks.
To continue the analogy to John Rawls’ theory of justice, we must view the exchange from
behind a “veil of ignorance.” RAWLS, supra note 31, at 136-42. From this original position
behind a veil of ignorance, it seems fair to let the harm stay where it fell as long as there
was a fair exchange of risks and benefits.
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understanding of a balanced, reciprocal exchange. Imposing
background risks of common activities on all members of society as a
concession to the reality of community living and utility is necessary
to make a workable system.98 Without this balance of fairness and
utility, no model is practical.
B. Bargained-for Relationships
Fletcher also conceded that the paradigm of reciprocity could not
account for several categories of torts, including medical
malpractice,99 premises liability,100 and most significant for our
purposes, products liability.101 Fletcher believed these claims raised
special problems because of the consensual, bargained-for nature of
the relationships.102 The problem of applying Fletcher’s nonreciprocal
risk test directly to products liability is readily apparent. All products
create some risks for the consumer while the consumer typically
imposes no reciprocal risks upon the product manufacturer.103 Direct
application would result in the imposition of liability whenever the
user was injured by a product risk. Yet, at its philosophical epicenter,
the paradigm of reciprocity’s basic notions of freedom and autonomy
are also found at the heart of contract law generally.104 Therefore, it
is odd that Fletcher adopted a test that failed to account for
bargained-for exchanges.
The brilliance of the paradigm of reciprocity is its ability to apply
notions of consent and autonomy to wide-ranging activities, often
involving complete strangers. Reciprocity of risk supplies the means
to measure the default degree of security to which one is entitled in
the absence of expressed waiver or consent. Reciprocal risks are
implicitly accepted as a proxy for actual consent. But the test fails to
account for express or implied consent to risk in exchange for benefits,
other than the freedom to impose similar risks on others. The paradigm
of reciprocity must be modified to rectify this inherent weakness.

98. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 543.
99. See id. at 548 n.43.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 544 n.24.
102. Id. (discussing the market relationship between the manufacturer and consumer);
Id. at 548 n.43 (discussing negligence and the “liability of physicians to patients and
occupiers of land to persons injured on the premises”).
103. At least no risk distinct from those that users impose upon others generally.
104. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 10, §1.7; Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches
to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 829-33 (1983) (discussing, from a critical legal
studies perspective, the classic contract theory and its continuing influence on modern
contract law).
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C. Autonomy Not Reciprocity
The modification proposed here is referred to as the autonomy
paradigm. It applies a more comprehensive conception of individual
liberty, including consent to nonreciprocal risks in exchange for
benefits, as well as implicit consent to background risks of common
activities. This modification allows the autonomy paradigm to
explain bargained-for relationships that the paradigm of reciprocity
could not. In the case of medical treatment, the patient consents to
nonreciprocal risks created by the medical procedure in exchange for
the health benefits of the procedure.105 In premises liability, the
licensee, when properly informed of the risks, consents to them in
exchange for permission to enter for his own purposes.106 In products
liability, the consumer accepts certain risks of the product in
exchange for the product’s benefits.107 The nature of the benefits
depends on the tastes and motivations of the individual. Regardless
of the form of the benefits, when the individual can be said to have
consented to the risks of the product in return for the benefits of the
product, the exchange is fair and balanced, even if the risks imposed
are unilateral. The autonomy paradigm’s broad view of consent
allows it to serve as a useful model for resolving bargained-for
exchanges, including product liability claims.
IV. PRODUCTS LIABILITY: THE HISTORICAL ROUTE TO THE
THIRD RESTATEMENT
The historical development of products liability law, in particular
its evolution from contract to tort, is critical to understanding the
current state of the law. The evolution and merger of tort and
contract law in products liability was motivated by a desire to
achieve a balance between fairness and utility.108 Much of this
struggle for fairness has involved an effort to overcome the
contractual requirement of privity between the plaintiff and
defendant.109 When the conceptual “shackles of privity”110 were finally
105. See Howard v. Univ. of Med. & Dentistry of N.J., 800 A.2d 73, 78-79 (N.J. 2002)
(following the practice in most jurisdictions of treating cases of informed consent or failure
to warn as sounding in negligence); Montgomery v. Bazaz-Sehgal, 798 A.2d 742, 748 (Pa.
2002) (treating both nonconsensual surgery and lack of informed consent cases as sounding
in battery); cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) (recognizing
“that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical” care).
106. See, e.g., Houin v. Burger, 590 N.E.2d 593, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that a
“landowner also has a duty to warn a licensee of any latent danger on the premises of
which the landowner has knowledge”).
107. See Owen, Foundations, supra note 12, at 429-30.
108. See, e.g., William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 799-800 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, The Fall].
109. See id.
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cast off with the adoption of strict liability, the status of the plaintiff
was treated as irrelevant and the focus shifted exclusively to the
product.111 While this “equal” treatment was an improvement, it
ignored the important distinction between consumers and bystanders
that continues to this day. To understand the inequity that results
from this uniform treatment, we must begin at the beginning.
A. The Privity of Contract Requirement
Products liability law, born of contract principles, was limited for
years by its inability to see beyond the parameters of the express
agreement. Well into the twentieth century, the doctrine of caveat
emptor112 protected the manufacturer from liability when, in the
absence of fraud, the buyer had the opportunity to inspect the
goods.113 This was true even with regard to latent defects, likely to go
undiscovered by the buyer upon reasonable inspection.114 Assuming
equal bargaining power, the doctrine was not regarded as unjust
because the buyer, in theory, could require that the seller expressly
warrant the quality of the product.115
The problem is that the theory depends upon assumptions that
are not mirrored by reality.116 This contract conception of product
liability developed in a simpler time when the manufacturers of
goods met “face to face on an equal bargaining plane”117 with the
purchasers. The goods were often uncomplicated items, perhaps even
custom made to the buyer’s specifications, and the buyer was able to
110. Id. at 799. Prosser, as was his way, colorfully described the extension of express
and implied warranties to the buyer’s family and guests in the home by U.C.C. § 2-318 as
loosening the “shackles of privity to some small extent.” Id.
111. Both the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A requirement of a defect and the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability reasonable alternative design (RAD)
requirement put the emphasis on the product rather than the relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant.
112. “Let the buyer beware.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990).
113. See Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388-89 (1870); Tampa Shipbuilding & Eng’g
Co. v. Gen. Const. Co., 43 F.2d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1930).
114. See Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. 48, 52-53 (N.Y. 1804). Plaintiff purchased wood sold as
brazilletto wood, which is quite valuable, when in fact the wood was another variety of
little value. Id.
115. See Barnard, 77 U.S. at 388-89 (“No principle of the common law has been better
established, or more often affirmed, both in this country and in England, than that in sales
of personal property, in the absence of express warranty, where the buyer has an
opportunity to inspect the commodity, and the seller is guilty of no fraud, and is neither the
manufacturer nor grower of the article he sells, the maxim of caveat emptor applies.
Such a rule, requiring the purchaser to take care of his own interests, has been found best
adapted to the wants of trade in the business transactions of life. And there is no hardship
in it, because if the purchaser distrusts his judgment he can require of the seller a
warranty that the quality or condition of the goods he desires to buy corresponds with the
sample exhibited.”).
116. See Feinman, supra note 104 (discussing the defects of classic freedom-ofcontract theory).
117. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 80 (N.J. 1960).
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meaningfully inspect the product.118 As products became more
complex and manufacturers utilized mass production, mass
marketing, and retail distributors, the contractual model failed to
reflect the real world practices in which buyers lack the opportunity
and expertise to inspect the products or negotiate for an express
warranty.119 This change required a shift from contract law, where
the duty is determined by the parties’ express agreement, to tort law,
where duty is determined by foreseeability of harm.120
In recognition of these new realities, caveat emptor was gradually
replaced by caveat venditor.121 Implied warranties, described by
Professor William Prosser as “freak hybrid[s] born of the illicit
intercourse of tort and contract,” imposed upon sellers, as a matter of
law, the obligation to warrant that their products were free from
defects, known or unknown, and that they were fit for their ordinary
and intended uses.122 The rationale for these implied warranties was
that the purchaser pays a fair price “in expectation of an adequate
advantage, or recompense” in the form of a product free of defects.123
Historically, the requirement of privity applied both vertically,
preventing claims against manufacturers by remote purchasers,
and horizontally, preventing claims by users of products that were
not purchasers. The requirement of privity was originally justified
on the basis that the agreement cannot logically extend beyond
those who are a party to the agreement.124 This strict contractual
limitation on liability became increasingly at odds with the way
products are actually bought and sold. 125 Even as implied
warranties evolved to reflect the realities of mass produced, complex
products and retail distributors positioned between manufacturers

118. Id.
119. See id. at 80-83.
120. See Francis H. Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts,
53 AM. L. REG. 337, 353 (1905) (providing an insightful, detailed, and early discussion of
the need for a complete change from contract to tort-based liability of manufacturers and
seller for injuries resulting from products).
121. “Let the seller beware.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 222 (6th ed. 1990).
122. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 108, at 800.
123. Lane v. Trenholm Bldg. Co., 229 S.E.2d 728, 730 (S.C. 1976) (quoting Champneys
v. Johnson, 3 S.C.L. (2 Brev.) 268, 272 (1809)).
124. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842); Note, Strict Products
Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 923 (1964) (“In warranty, on the other
hand, privity—i.e., the existence of a direct contractual relationship—was a conceptual
necessity because the seller’s modern obligations for defective products developed as a part
of the law of contracts.”).
125. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 108, at 792-93 (discussing Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) and focusing on modern product distribution and
marketing as central to the abandonment of the privity requirement in product liability).
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and the ultimate consumer of products, the requirement of privity of
contract remained.126
The privity requirement was also clearly at odds with tort law’s
focus on foreseeability of harm as the linchpin of liability.127
Nevertheless, the privity requirement was applied to negligence
claims as well as warranty claims.128 In addition to the contractbased benefit of the bargain rationale, the privity requirement was
justified as necessary to promote the development of industry and
thus further utilitarian goals. As one court explained:
If a . . . manufacturer who constructs a boiler, piece of machinery,
or a steam-ship, owes a duty to the whole world, that his work or
his machine or his steam-ship shall contain no hidden defect, it is
difficult to measure the extent of his responsibility, and no prudent
man would engage in such occupations upon such conditions. It is
safer and wiser to confine such liabilities to the parties
immediately concerned.129

Reasonable minds might dispute the conclusion that the greatest
good for the greatest number is maximized by the policy of promoting
industry at the cost of the injured party. Yet it is the utilitarian
calculus that permits the debate.
Over time, the citadel of privity was progressively riddled with
exceptions and ultimately fell under the onslaught.130 Early
exceptions, premised on the tort concept of foreseeability of harm,
were limited to the sale of “imminently” or “inherently” dangerous
products like poisons, drugs, guns, explosives, and foodstuffs.131 In
the seminal case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Judge Cardozo
expanded the exception to all negligence claims where the
manufacturer foresees danger to persons other than the purchaser.132
Of course, the plaintiff still had to prove negligence on the part of the
126. Id.; DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 4.5 (2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter
OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY].
127. See Bohlen, supra note 120, at 353-55 (“The duty is not one created by the contract
of sale and so restricted to those party thereto, but is a legal incident to the vendor’s
previous position as manufacturer, a position voluntarily assumed for his own profit, and
so extends to all whose safety must depend on his care in manufacture. . . . To encourage
commerce and industry by removing all duty and incentive to protect the public is to invite
wholesale sacrifice of individual rights on the altar of commercial greed.”); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 395 cmt. b (1965) (stating that a manufacturer’s liability in
negligence rests “upon the foreseeability of harm if proper care is not used”).
128. See, e.g., Borg-Warner Corp. v. Heine, 128 F.2d 657, 658-59 (6th Cir. 1942); see
also Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932, 938-40 (Me. 1982) (in which Maine became
the last state to abandon the privity requirement in negligence-based product liability actions).
129. Curtin v. Somerset, 21 A. 244, 245 (Pa. 1891).
130. Prosser, The Fall, supra note 108, at 793 (discussing the history of the privity
requirement in product liability and its progressive exceptions culminating in its
complete abandonment).
131. See id.; OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 2.1.
132. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916).
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manufacturer. The privity requirement remained, however, with
regard to contract-based express and implied warranty cases.133
B. Strict Liability in Tort
Rather than eliminate the privity requirement in contract-based
warranty claims, Dean William Prosser advanced a variety of
arguments supporting the imposition of strict liability in tort for
injuries caused by defective products. These rationales were applied
by Justice Roger Traynor in his famous concurring opinion in Escola
v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., upholding a verdict for a waitress injured
by a defective Coke bottle that exploded.134 Almost twenty years later,
Justice Traynor, writing for a unanimous court in Greenman v. Yuba
Power Products, Inc., affirmed a verdict for a power tool user injured
when the tool vibrated loose allowing a piece of wood he was working
on to fly out and strike him on the head.135 In so doing, the court
rejected the defendant’s warranty-based defenses, holding that
liability is not dependent upon the law of contract but is imposed by
the law of strict liability in tort.136
The rationale for the imposition of strict liability in tort, in
particular enterprise liability, consists of a mixture of fairness and
utilitarian concerns. Inasmuch as the sellers seek to encourage
consumers to trust in their product’s safety and fitness for ordinary
and foreseeable uses, fairness demands that they should stand
behind their products when the consumers’ expectations are
disappointed and they are injured by product defects.137 Consumers
must rely upon manufacturers to evaluate the product’s safety prior
to sale because consumers are not capable of performing independent
evaluations of modern complex products.138 Finally, those that benefit
from the risks of the product (i.e., manufacturers, sellers, and
consumers) should absorb the cost of injuries rather than the injured
party alone.139
However, much of the strict liability scholarship and relevant
cases focus upon instrumentalist concerns.140 Manufacturers are in

133. In fact, in some jurisdictions, the privity requirement remains.
134. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring).
135. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 898-99, 902 (Cal. 1963).
136. Id. at 900-01.
137. Id. at 901; OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.4.
138. Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901; Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1298-99 (discussing
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.).
139. Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1286.
140. See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 500-07 (1961); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, A Positive
Economic Analysis of Products Liability, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 535 (1985) (discussing
economic efficiency rationales supporting the development of products liability law);
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the best position to insure against the risk of product injury and
distribute these costs to the consuming public as a cost of
production.141 Enterprise liability forces manufacturers to internalize
the cost of accidents caused by defective products and thereby creates
incentives for the manufacturer to improve product safety.142 In this
way, the cost-benefit analysis is evaluated automatically by the
market, and efficiency is achieved.143 Efficiency is further enhanced
by allowing an injured plaintiff to seek compensation directly from
manufacturers rather than retail sellers. Under warranty law,
plaintiffs would seek recovery from the retailer and the retailer
would seek contribution and indemnification from manufacturers for
damages paid to injured purchasers.144 This circuitous path, often
involving successive suits, wasted judicial resources, created the
potential for inconsistent verdicts, and increased transaction costs.145
These instrumentalist and fairness rationales were both key to
the American Law Institute’s approval of § 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts in 1966 (Second Restatement).146 Section 402A
imposes strict liability on the seller of products to the user or
consumer under the following circumstances:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to
liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or
consumer,
or
to
his
property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale
of
his
product,
and

George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 CARDOZO L. REV. 2301
(1989) [hereinafter Priest, Strict].
141. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.4; Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Products
Liability in the Conflict of Laws—Toward a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under
“Foreseeable and Insurable Laws”: II, 69 YALE L.J. 794 (1960) (analyzing the effect of the
insurance and risk distribution rationales of enterprise liability to conflict of law issues).
142. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 1944);
Calabresi, supra note 140, at 502 (As Professor Calabresi explains, in theory, this also
enhances autonomy by allowing the consumer to “cast an informed vote in making his
purchases.”); George L. Priest, The Modern Transformation of Civil Law, 54 BUFF. L. REV.
957, 958 (2006).
143. See Calabresi, supra note 140; Priest, supra note 142.
144. See, e.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 442; William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the
Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1123-24 (1960) [hereinafter
Prosser, Assault].
145. See, e.g., Escola, 150 P.2d at 442; Prosser, Assault, supra note 144, at 1124.
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. c (1965).
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(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.147

The effect of § 402A was to provide warranty protection to users
and consumers without any of the contractual-based privity
limitations.148 While it imposed strict liability, it did not make the
seller of the product an insurer of all harm that results from the uses
of the product. Liability was limited to harm caused by a product
“defect” that rendered the product unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer.149 Comment (g) specified that the rule only applied
where the product leaves the seller’s hands “in a condition not
contemplated by the ultimate consumer,” which renders it
“unreasonably dangerous to him.”150 As explained in Comment (i), a
product was unreasonably dangerous when it was “dangerous to an
extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary
consumer who purchase[d] it, with the ordinary knowledge common
to the community as to its characteristics.”151 These comments led to
the development of what came to be known as the consumer
expectation test.152
C. Consumer Expectations to Reasonableness
The criticisms of the consumer expectation test are legion and
began almost immediately.153 The test is largely the result of the
contract-based implied warranty roots from which strict products
liability developed.154 Contract law is concerned fundamentally with
protecting the reasonable expectations induced by the bargained-for
exchange.155 The consumer expectation test was simple enough to
apply to manufacturing defects where the consumer expected the
product to conform to the intended design of the product.156 However,
147. Id. § 402A (emphasis added).
148. Id. § 402A cmt. m.
149. Id. § 402A cmt. g.
150. Id.
151. Id. § 402A cmt. i.
152. See, e.g., Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 475 P.2d 964, 966 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970);
Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (Ill. 1969).
153. See, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980);
Mary J. Davis, Design Defect Liability: In Search of a Standard of Responsibility, 39
WAYNE L. REV. 1217, 1235-37 (1993); Reed Dickerson, Products Liability: How Good Does a
Product Have to Be?, 42 IND. L.J. 301 (1967); David A. Fischer, Products Liability—The
Meaning of Defect, 39 MO. L. REV. 339 (1974); Montgomery & Owen, supra note 89.
154. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.6 (discussing the warranty roots
of the test).
155. See 1 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.1 (rev. ed. 1993).
156. Owen, Foundations, supra note 12, at 467 (“[W]hile consumers may abstractly
comprehend the practical necessity of allowing imperfect production, their actual
expectation when purchasing a new product is that its important attributes will match
those of other similar units.”).
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when the product was in the precise condition the manufacturer
intended, it was far from clear how the consumer expectation test
should apply. Indeed, as numerous commentators have recognized,
the drafters of § 402A did not formulate this test with the intent that
it would be applied to design defect claims.157
The problems of the consumer expectation test were particularly
acute where the product design feature involved a sophisticated and
technologically complex product about which the consumer had little
understanding and only the most general expectations regarding
performance and safety.158 To illustrate this problem, Professor
Twerski discussed a claim involving an injury caused when the
driver’s seat of the plaintiff’s Ford Navistar collapsed following a rear
end collision with a 53,000 pound dump truck traveling at thirty
miles per hour.159 Ford maintained that the seat was designed with a
less rigid structure intended to yield and thereby reduce injuries to
occupants in more common, lower impact collisions.160 This design
choice involved a compromise between risks that was almost
certainly unknown to the consumer. How should the consumer
expectation test be applied to such a design compromise between
risks? Do consumers expect that seats are designed to provide the
greatest protection in the most severe collisions or the most probable
collisions? Do consumers have any expectations regarding the seat
design? Whatever design is implemented, those whose injuries could
have been reduced by the selection of the alternative design could
claim their expectations were not met.161 In either case, can one say
the actual risks associated with the product were greater than those
that the consumer expected? The standard leaves tremendous

157. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerksi, A Proposed Revision of Section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1512, 1526 (1992) (“No one,
for example, could have foreseen that language written primarily to govern manufacturing
defect cases might be used by courts in design and warning defect cases.”); Kysar, supra
note 24, at 1712-14 (discussing the limited authority for consumer expectations analysis in
design defect claims at the time of the drafting of § 402A and the lack of guidance the
Second Restatement comments provide for formulating a workable standard for
determining consumer expectation or justifying the standard and citing other authority for
the same); Priest, Strict, supra note 140, at 2303 (stating that the founders of § 402A
thought it would apply only to manufacturing defects and assumed that design defect cases
would be controlled by negligence law).
158. See Barker v. Lull Eng’g Co., 573 P.2d 443, 447, 454-55 (Cal. 1978) (adopting a
consumer expectation test for simple design issues and a risk utility test for complex
designs but shifting the burden to the defendant to prove that the design was not
defective); see also Soule v. Gen. Motors Corp., 882 P.2d 298, 308 (Cal. 1994).
159. Aaron D. Twerski, In Defense of the Products Liability Restatement: Part I, 8 KAN.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 27, 31 (1998). The hypothetical is based upon the facts of an unpublished
case before the Missouri Supreme Court. See id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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discretion to the jury and provides little guidance to aid them in their
design defect determination.162
In other cases, the consumer expectation test seemed to work
against the goals of strict liability. For example, if a product contains
a dangerous design feature readily apparent to the consumer, is the
consumer denied recovery even where the hazard could have been
cheaply and simply reduced or eliminated by a change in design? On
one hand, it is hard to see how the consumer did not expect the
dangers of an open and obvious hazard.163 Indeed, some courts held
that the test precludes recovery where the dangerousness of the
product did not exceed the risk contemplated by the consumer
despite the availability of a reasonable alternative design.164 On the
other hand, such a literal interpretation of the test frustrates the
goal of encouraging manufacturers to improve product safety by
reducing risk when it is feasible to do so.165 In order to allow recovery
for the open and obvious hazards of a product design, other courts
have held that the obvious nature of the hazard is just one factor to
be considered in determining if the product is unreasonably
dangerous.166 It could be argued that consumers expect
manufacturers will incorporate safer alternative designs despite the
consumer’s awareness of the hazard presented by the actual design.167
Prompted by the difficulty of applying the consumer expectation
test to design defect claims, Professors James Henderson and Aaron
Twerski urged the adoption of an alternative test for liability.168 The
American Law Institute agreed that revisions to § 402A were
necessary and appointed Professors Henderson and Twerski as
162. See id. (“To use the consumer expectations test as a standard of liability in a
design defect case is just plain silly.”).
163. Phillips, supra note 24, at 1049-52 (arguing that barring claims based upon
obvious product hazards results from an unnecessarily narrow conception of expectations).
164. See, e.g., Chaney v. Hobart Int’l, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 677, 681 (E.D. La. 1999)
(stating that the hazards of a meat grinder without a feed pan guard are open and obvious
to the consumer); Irion v. Sun Lighting, Inc., No. M2002-00766-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL
746823, at *16 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2004) (holding that the dangers of a torchiere style
halogen light was obvious to the ordinary consumer despite evidence of a reasonable
alternative design consisting of a wire guard placed over the bulb); Vincer v. Esther
Williams All-Aluminum Swimming Pool Co., 230 N.W.2d 794, 799 (Wis. 1975) (stating that
the hazard of a swimming pool to a two-year-old child is obvious to the consumer so no
liability exists for failure to include a self-latching gate).
165. See, e.g., Palmer v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 476 P.2d 713, 719 (Wash. Ct. App.
1970) (“The manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to escape because
the product was obviously a bad one.”); Philip H. Corboy, The Not-So-Quiet Revolution:
Rebuilding Barriers to Jury Trial in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1043, 1088 (1994) (noting that the consumer expectation test
has been applied by courts as a tool to apply the open and obvious danger rule in
contravention of the goals of strict liability).
166. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Koehring Co., 391 F. Supp. 206, 210-12 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
167. See Phillips, supra note 24, at 1049-1051 (suggesting that consumers expect that
manufacturers will make their products safe despite patent dangers).
168. Henderson & Twerksi, supra note 157, at 1514-26.
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reporters for the products liability provisions of the Restatement
(Third) of Torts, the final draft of which was approved in May 1997.
V. FAIRNESS AND UTILITY IN THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability recognizes
three broad categories of product defects: manufacturing defects,
warning defects, and design defects.169 The standard for imposing
liability is distinct for each of these three categories. While strict
liability is retained for manufacturing defects, strict liability has
been rejected in favor of a risk-utility balancing test for warning and
design defect claims. This dramatic departure from strict liability has
resulted in substantial criticism that the Third Restatement is
industry friendly and has abandoned the fairness concerns that gave
birth to strict products liability.170
The next section examines the three categories of product defect
as stated in the Third Restatement from the perspective of both the
autonomy paradigm and the paradigm of reasonableness. Despite the
abandonment of strict liability for warnings and design defect claims,
this analysis reveals that the Third Restatement seeks to balance
fairness and utility, and generally succeeds. The one glaring
exception is when bystanders are injured by the inherent risks of
certain socially useful products. As discussed in Part VI, further
reform to the Third Restatement is necessary to provide for a fair and
balanced treatment of bystanders injured by these products.
A. Manufacturing Defects
Under the Third Restatement, a product “contains a
manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended
design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation
and marketing of the product.”171 This category of product defect is
the only one for which the Third Restatement imposes strict
liability.172 Common examples of manufacturing defects include
products that are contaminated, physically flawed, damaged, or
incorrectly assembled.173 A manufacturer is liable for injuries caused

169. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). The Third
Restatement also recognizes distinct product categories and standards of liability for
prescription drugs, medical devices, and used products. Id. §§ 6, 8. These categories may
raise additional fairness concerns that are not specifically addressed by this Article.
However, the same analysis could be applied.
170. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.
171. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(a) (1998).
172. Id. § 2 cmt. a.
173. Id. § 2 cmt. c.
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by a manufacturing defect even when reasonable care is exercised in
manufacturing, testing, and inspecting the product.
Just as the reasonableness paradigm cannot account for strict
liability for ultrahazardous activities, it also cannot account for the
persistence of strict liability in manufacturing defect cases. The
selection of raw materials, the manufacturing process, testing,
assembly, and quality control all involve considerable risk-utility
considerations on the part of the manufacturer. For example, failure
to implement reasonable but costly inspection procedures could
result in a manufacturing defect going undetected and injuring the
consumer.174 But even if the manufacturer could have prevented the
manufacturing defect from reaching the consumer only through
extraordinary precautions that would be cost prohibitive under a
reasonableness analysis, the manufacturer is still liable for harms
caused by the defect.175
Consider, for example, the case in which the wire strands
designed to hold an automobile tire securely to the wheel’s flange
contained a manufacturing defect that caused the pressurized tire to
blow over the tire flange and injure the plaintiff.176 If the defect could
be detected by a visual or tactile inspection of the product, a
reasonable manufacturer might inspect for such a defect, given the
probability of harm in the event of the defect. If the defect were
exceedingly rare, however, and could be detected only by a
prohibitively costly x-ray inspection of the wire strands, the
reasonableness paradigm would not impose liability for harm caused
by the failure to implement such inspections. To impose liability
under such circumstances would be an inefficient use of resources.
The consumer would have to pay more for the tires (as the inspection
costs are passed through) without receiving a commensurate increase
in security.
In contrast, the autonomy model is descriptively simple and nicely
explains the imposition of liability under both scenarios regardless of
the efficiency concerns. Returning to the tire explosion scenario, the
consumer is aware of certain risks associated with the use of an
automobile and its tire components. He is aware that the tire will
lose tread and traction over time. If he drives over curbs or nails, the
tire may become damaged or deflated and cause him to lose control of
his vehicle and possibly cause him injury. He may even be aware that

174. Id. § 2 cmt. a. Utilitarian concerns may also be furthered to the extent that strict
liability encourages manufacturers to implement reasonable manufacturing and inspecting
procedures knowing that they may be held liable for all injuries resulting from design
defects even if it would be impossible for the plaintiff to identify the faulty procedure that
allowed the defect to reach the consumer. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Dico Tire, Inc., v. Cisneros, 953 S.W.2d. 776, 784 (Tex. App. 1997).
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if he grossly overinflates the tire, it could explode and cause him
injury.177 All of these risks are nonreciprocal in that the plaintiff does
not impose commensurate risks on the tire manufacturer. But
liability is not imposed for these expected risks. Yet the autonomy of
the individual is preserved because he has waived a degree of
security in exchange for the benefits of the tire. He has implicitly
consented to these expected risks and presumably has determined
that the exchange is fair.
However, if the manufacturer produces a tire that is defective
because it does not conform to the intended design, the consumer’s
expectations are disappointed and his security has been compromised
to a greater degree than that to which he consented. Indeed,
consumers expect certain risks associated with the use of all
products. When using a carving knife to carve the Thanksgiving
turkey, for example, the consumer has accepted certain risks,
including the possibility that he might be cut by the sharp knife.178
These risks are accepted in exchange for the benefits of having a
sharp knife. However, if the consumer is cut when the knife’s handle
snaps due to a manufacturing defect, he has been exposed to a risk
beyond that to which he consented when he purchased and used the
product.179 Accordingly, the consumer did not receive a fair exchange
of risks and benefits, and liability is imposed regardless of fault.
Yet the failure of the reasonableness paradigm to justify the
imposition of strict liability for manufacturing defects does not mean
that the Third Restatement fails to account for the demands of social
utility. The imposition of liability does not force the manufacturer to
implement inefficient manufacturing and inspection practices;
instead, the manufacturer must pay for the harms that result from
the processes selected. The manufacturer can pass these costs on to
consumers of the nondefective products who have determined that
the benefits of the product justify its higher price as well as the risks
associated with the use of the product in its intended design.180
B. Warning Defects
While strict liability is imposed for manufacturing defects,
liability for warning or informational defects claims are imposed only
177. Such knowledge could result from common experience as evidenced by consumer
expectations or warnings supplied by the manufacturer.
178. Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 630 (1992) (noting that although the Consumer
Products Safety Commission reports over 417,000 knife injuries a year, almost no product
liability claims are brought because consumers appreciate the risks).
179. See Nugent v. Utica Cutlery Co., 636 S.W.2d 805 (Tex. App. 1982). In Nugent, a
knife blade broke and flew into plaintiff’s eye while stripping heavy gauge wire. Id. The
jury refused to find a manufacturing defect, presumably because the knife was misused. Id.
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. a (1998).
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after a finding of fault under the Third Restatement.181 The
Restatement provides that a product “is defective because of
inadequate instructions or warnings when the foreseeable risks of
harm posed by the product could have been reduced or avoided by the
provision of reasonable instructions or warnings . . . and the omission
of the instructions or warnings renders the product not reasonably
safe.”182 Although a single definition of warning defect is defined in
§ 2(c), it is clear from Comment (i) that the Third Restatement
recognizes two distinct warning requirements: risk-reduction
warnings and informed-choice warnings.183
1. Risk-reduction Warnings
Risk-reduction warnings inform the user how to avoid or reduce
the risk of product hazards. For example, informing the user that eye
protection should always be worn when using the product is a typical
risk-reduction warning. With regard to risk-reduction warnings, the
Third Restatement adopts a risk-utility test virtually indistinguishable
from negligence.184 Nevertheless, both the paradigm of
reasonableness and the autonomy paradigm account for these riskreduction warnings in product liability cases. Even where the utility
of the product justifies the risk from a social welfare perspective, the
product must have adequate warnings or instructions for use that
will allow the user to avoid or reduce the dangers.185 This
requirement is consistent with the reasonableness paradigm because
making the use of the product safer enhances social welfare by
decreasing the costs of the product’s use, while still retaining the
product’s utility.186
However, autonomy is also protected by providing information to
the user of the product that will allow the user to make informed
decisions about waiving a certain degree of security in exchange for
the benefit of using the product.187 Similarly, if the product does not
contain adequate warnings or instruction, the autonomy paradigm
imposes liability because the user of the product was exposed to a

181. Id.
182. Id. § 2(c).
183. See id. § 2 cmt. i.
184. Id. § 2 cmt. d.
185. Id.
186. See id.; see, e.g., Hollister v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 201 F.3d 731, 741 (6th Cir.
2000) (applying Michigan law to a suit alleging that a shirt was defective because the
manufacturer failed to warn of the shirt’s dangerous flammability).
187. See Madden, supra note 12, at 1059-67 (discussing how the Third Restatement
section on warning defects balances both corrective justice and economic efficiency concerns).

628

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:597

risk that was not consented to in exchange for the benefits sought
from the product.188
2. Informed-choice Warnings
The Third Restatement also imposes liability where the product
contains risks of use that are inherent in the product and might not
be avoidable or reduced as a result of the warning provided.189 These
types of warnings are known as informed-choice warnings because
they allow the user to make an autonomous choice whether to
confront the danger or avoid it by choosing not to use the product.190
This rationale is expressly discussed in Comment (i) to § 2 of the
Third Restatement:
In addition to alerting users and consumers to the existence
and nature of product risks so that they can, by appropriate
conduct during use or consumption, reduce the risk of harm,
warnings also may be needed to inform users and consumers of
nonobvious and not generally known risks that unavoidably inhere
in using or consuming the product. Such warnings allow the user
or consumer to avoid the risk warned against by making an
informed decision not to purchase or use the product at all and
hence not to encounter the risk. In this context, warnings must be
provided for inherent risks that reasonably foreseeable product
users and consumers would reasonably deem material or
significant in deciding whether to use or consume the product.
Whether or not many persons would, when warned, nonetheless
decide to use or consume the product, warnings are required to
protect the interests of those reasonably foreseeable users or
consumers who would, based on their own reasonable assessments
of the risks and benefits, decline product use or consumption.191

These warnings are distinct from risk-reduction warnings that
inform the user how to avoid or reduce the risk of hazard while using
the product.
The autonomy paradigm clearly accounts for the requirement of
additional, nonutilitarian warnings. These warnings provide users of
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998). The
Third Restatement also provides that a product seller is not subject to liability for failing to
warn or instruct regarding risks and risk-avoidance measures that should be obvious to, or
generally known by, foreseeable product users. Id. cmt. j. See Madden, supra note 12, at
1037, for a detailed analysis of the balancing of autonomy and utility in this provision, with
which I concur.
189. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998).
190. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON D. TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
PROBLEMS & PROCESS 352 (6th ed. 2008) (providing a detailed discussion of the distinction
between risk-reduction warnings and informed-choice warnings as well as the distinct
rationales, utilitarian for the former and individual rights for the latter, justifying the two
types of warning).
191. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. i (1998).
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the product with knowledge of the product’s dangers that allow them
to make informed individual decisions regarding the degree of risk
they are willing to encounter regardless of the utility of the
product.192 The only purpose for the warning is to allow users to make a
subjective determination as to whether the risks are worth the
benefits, regardless of the objective risk-utility calculation that might
be made from the social welfare reasonableness paradigm.193 It allows
users to decline to use even efficient products because they are
unwilling to waive their right to be free from the additional risks.194
Accordingly, the autonomy paradigm provides a clear rationale for these
informed-choice warnings while the reasonableness paradigm cannot.
These informed-choice warnings are widely recognized in products
liability cases and have been particularly prevalent in claims
involving prescription drugs and toxic materials.195 For example, in
Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., the plaintiff contracted
asbestosis as a result of working with asbestos insulation.196 In this
early asbestos case, the court acknowledged that “[t]he utility of an
insulation product containing asbestos may outweigh the known or
foreseeable risk.”197 Nevertheless, the court held that the
manufacturer had a duty to warn of the hazard because the worker
had a right to decide whether to be exposed to the risk even if the
manufacturer could not otherwise reduce the hazard.198
Pharmaceutical cases based upon failure to provide informedchoice warnings often have presented insurmountable evidentiary
192. Id.
193. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973)
(“The rationale for this rule is that the user or consumer is entitled to make his own choice
as to whether the product’s utility or benefits justify exposing himself to the risk of harm.
Thus, a true choice situation arises, and a duty to warn attaches, whenever a reasonable man
would want to be informed of the risk in order to decide whether to expose himself to it.”).
194. See David E. Bernstein, Learning the Wrong Lessons From “An American
Tragedy”: A Critique of the Berger-Twerski Informed Choice Proposal, 104 MICH. L. REV.
1961 (2006). Professor Bernstein has argued informed choice warnings impose serious costs
on society by causing consumers to avoid useful products because of unrealistic or
disproportionate fears. For example, some parents refuse to vaccinate their children
because of unsubstantiated claims that a preservative in the vaccines causes autism. Id.
at 1977.
195. See generally Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed
Choice: Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257 (2005) (discussing the application of
informed-choice warnings to pharmaceutical and toxic tort claims).
196. Borel, 493 F.2d at 1081.
197. Id. at 1105.
198. Id. at 1105-06. While the reader, armed with today’s knowledge of the incredible
harm caused by asbestos, may dispute that a risk-utility analysis could weigh in favor of
the use of asbestos-containing products, the general problem of hidden dangers within
socially useful products is not readily disputable. In fact, an EPA ban on asbestoscontaining products was struck down because of the failure to properly consider the risk
and benefits of asbestos compared to alternative products. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v.
Envtl. Prot. Agency, 947 F.2d 1201, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1991) (striking down the EPA’s
asbestos ban).
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hurdles for plaintiffs in terms of establishing scientific proof of
causation.199 While the Third Restatement does not provide an
independent cause of action that allows plaintiffs to recover for the
failure to provide informed-choice warnings where proof of causation
is lacking, such an independent cause of action has been suggested.200
Professors Berger and Twerski conclude that the tremendous hurdles
presented by Daubert’s reliability requirements,201 and the associated
costs of litigation, render it impossible to prove causation in many
pharmaceutical cases.202 The solution they propose is a cause of
action that would compensate the plaintiff, not for the unproven
drug-related injury, but for the depravation of the right to make an
autonomous decision regarding the use of the product caused by the
failure to warn of scientifically uncertain but material risks.203 The
cause of action would be similar to negligent infliction of emotional
distress, and the plaintiff would be permitted to recover dignitary
tort damages for the loss of the right to autonomous
decisionmaking.204 Such a cause of action cannot be justified by the
reasonableness paradigm because, from an objective risk-benefit
analysis, the product’s known risks are outweighed by its perceived
benefits. However, the autonomy paradigm supports such a cause of
action because individual consumers should have the right to make
subjective determinations about whether they are willing to consent
to the risks in exchange for the benefits of the drug.
While most informed-choice warning claims have involved toxic
torts and pharmaceutical products, the theory has been extended to
other products liability cases where these evidentiary issues are less
burdensome. In Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., for example, the plaintiffs
were injured following the rollover of a 1986 Ford Bronco II.205
Plaintiffs claimed that Ford failed to warn of the substantial stability
problems associated with the Bronco II, despite knowledge of the
vehicle’s propensity to roll over even at low speeds.206 Ford’s expert
maintained that no warning could have prevented the rollover that
occurred because the plaintiff was confronted with the need for an
emergency maneuver that was necessary regardless of the operator’s
knowledge of the potential for a rollover.207 The court rejected this
199. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 195, at 258. See Bernstein, supra note 194, for a
critical response to this article.
200. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 195, at 259.
201. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
202. See Berger & Twerski, supra note 195, at 264-67 (discussing the paucity of preapproval studies, the rejection of animal studies, and the numerous reasons courts find to
reject expert opinions based upon epidemiological studies).
203. Id. at 282-87.
204. See id.
205. Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1215 (11th Cir. 1999).
206. Id. at 1219.
207. Id.
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argument, noting risk reduction was only one purpose of product
warnings.208 The court recognized that a more fundamental purpose
of such a warning is to allow consumers to make informed decisions
whether to use the product in the first instance.209 Such warnings
allow users to decline to use even the most efficient products where
they are unwilling to waive their right to be free from the additional
risks.210 Under the facts of the case, Watkins is an example of an
informed-choice warning; because the emergency maneuver was
unavoidable, the warning could not have prevented the accident
through safer use. The warning could have prevented the accident
only if the plaintiff, so warned, chose not to purchase the product.
Many other cases involve warnings that serve both to reduce risk
as well as to protect autonomous decisionmaking. For example,
manufacturers of three-wheeled all-terrain vehicles (ATVs) incurred
tremendous liability as a result of the propensity of ATVs to flip over
causing serious injuries to the riders.211 While the ATVs probably
were defectively designed under a risk-utility analysis,212 the
manufacturers also failed to properly warn consumers of the inherent
danger of rollovers.213 Such warnings would not only help users to
avoid injury by exercising extreme care but would also enable them
to make an informed choice about whether they wished to confront
the risk in the first instance.214
The debate continues as to whether manufacturers should be
strictly liable for failure to warn of dangers that they reasonably
could not have foreseen.215 The trend in most jurisdictions, and the
position taken by the Third Restatement, is that the duty to warn is
limited to those risks of which the manufacturer had knowledge or

208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
211. Sidney Shapiro, Ruth Ruttenberg & Paul Leigh, The Social Costs of Dangerous
Products: An Empirical Investigation, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775, 816 (2009)
(reporting that the average value of claims settled by Honda, the largest manufacturer of
three-wheel ATVs, for accidents between 1978 and 1988 was $859,003 and that Honda had
paid $84 million in settlements through 1990).
212. Id. at 815 (discussing the dangerous design aspects of three-wheel ATVs).
213. See Consumer Products Safety Comm’n, ATV Action Plans (2008),
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/cpsia/atvactionplan.pdf (providing links to the consent decrees);
Gary T. Ford & Michael B. Mazis, Informing Buyers of Risks: Analysis of the Marketing
and Regulation of All Terrain Vehicles, 30 J. CONSUMER AFF . 90 (1996) (discussing
the manufacturer’s failure to warn consumers of the inherent dangers of three-wheel ATVs
and analyzing the effectiveness of the 1988 consent decree between the Department of
Justice and the ATV manufacturers which required numerous advertising, warning, and
training measures).
214. See Ogozaly v. Am. Honda Motor Co. Inc., 67 Pa. D. & C.4th 314, 319-20 (Pa. C.P.
Lackawanna Cnty. 2004) (discussing a dispute between Honda and U-Haul over informed
choice warnings U-Haul added to Honda ATVs it leased to consumers).
215. See Wertheimer, supra note 24.
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reasonably should have had knowledge.216 This approach, despite the
strict liability misnomer used by some courts, is identical to a
negligence approach and fits well within the reasonableness paradigm.
But the imposition of strict liability for failure to warn even of
unknowable risks remains the law in some jurisdictions.217 This
approach cannot be justified by the reasonableness paradigm because
it imposes liability even when the reasonable defendant could not
take the unknown risk into account when preparing product
warnings. The autonomy paradigm, however, does account for the
imposition of liability for unknowable risks because the consumer
does not consent to these risks. As between the manufacturer and the
consumer, the manufacturer, as the expert, is in the best position to
discover these dangers and should compensate the consumer for the
loss that its product causes.218 Manufacturers can test the product
and have profited from the sale of the product.219 They can also
spread the cost of the harm to all of those that continue to find utility
in the product despite its newly discovered dangers.
C. Design Defects
Certainly, no area of products liability law has been the subject of
more controversy or confusion than the proper standard for liability
in claims involving design defects. Faced with the difficulty of
applying the amorphous consumer expectation test of § 402A,
commentators and the courts quickly turned to the more familiar,
and seemingly more precise,220 risk-utility test common to

216. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. m (1998)
(“Unforeseeable risks arising from foreseeable product use or consumption by definition
cannot specifically be warned against. Thus, in connection with a claim of inadequate
design, instruction, or warning, plaintiff should bear the burden of establishing that the
risk in question was known or should have been known to the relevant manufacturing
community. The harms that result from unforeseeable risks—for example, in the human
body’s reaction to a new drug, medical device, or chemical—are not a basis of liability.”).
217. See, e.g., Johnson v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 740 P.2d 548, 549 (Haw. 1987);
Sternhagen v. Dow Co., 935 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Mont. 1997); Green v. Smith & Nephew AHP,
Inc., 629 N.W.2d 727, 732 (Wis. 2001); see also Wertheimer, supra note 24, at 900-06.
218. Wertheimer, supra note 24, at 902 (citing Green, 629 N.W.2d at 754-55).
219. See Green, 629 N.W.2d at 750 (“[T]he primary ‘rationale underlying the imposition
of strict liability on manufacturers and sellers is that the risk of the loss associated with
the use of defective products should be borne by those who have created the risk and who
have reaped the profit by placing a defective product in the stream of commerce.’ ” (quoting
Kemp v. Miller, 453 N.W.2d 872 (Wis. 1990)); Korzec, supra note 24, at 242 (noting that
“the manufacturer still profits at the expense of the injured consumer from a product
containing unknowable or undiscoverable product defects”).
220. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 571 (“In assessing the
reasonableness of risks, lawyers ask many seemingly precise questions . . . . One can speak of
formulae, like the Learned Hand formula, and argue in detail about questions of costs, benefits
and trade-offs. This style of thinking is attractive to the legal mind.” (footnote omitted)).
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negligence.221 While these tests vary in their formulation, they
invariably resemble some form of cost-benefit calculus. This
utilitarian test for design defects has been embraced as the sole test
by the Third Restatement.222 Specifically, the Third Restatement
provides that a product “is defective in design when the foreseeable
risks of harm posed by the product could have been reduced or
avoided by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design . . . and
the omission of the alternative design renders the product not
reasonably safe.”223 The requirement of a reasonable alternative
design (RAD) involves establishing that the proposed alternative
design reduces or eliminates the hazard while not creating other
hazards, at a reasonable cost both in terms of product price and
utility.224 Consumer expectations may be considered in the riskutility calculus (particularly where consumer expectations are
influenced by product marketing), but they cannot prevail where the
utilitarian balance weighs in favor of the product design feature that
injured the plaintiff or where the plaintiff fails to produce evidence of
a RAD.225 In short, the plaintiff must build a better mousetrap,
automobile, or drill press as the case may be.
The Third Restatement’s RAD test mirrors the reasonableness
paradigm even more clearly than does the typical negligence claim.
In most jurisdictions, jurors are instructed that negligence is the
failure to exercise reasonable care for the safety of others under the
circumstances of the case.226 This leaves tremendous latitude for the
jury to determine what factors to consider and how to weigh these
factors in determining if the conduct created an unreasonable risk of
harm.227 The Third Restatement’s test expressly incorporates the
221. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d reporters’
note II.A. (1998) (citing Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 326 N.W.2d 372, 378-79 (Mich.
1982); Voss v. Black & Decker Mfg., 450 N.E.2d 204, 208 (N.Y. 1983); Turner v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 847 (Tex. 1979)); id. at II.B. (citing Radiation Tech., Inc. v.
Ware Constr. Co., 445 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983); St. Germain v. Husqvarna Corp., 544
A.2d 1283, 1286 (Me. 1988); Claytor v. Gen. Motors Corp., 286 S.E.2d 129, 132 (S.C. 1982)).
222. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2(b) (1998).
223. Id.
224. Id. § 2 cmt. f.
225. Id. § 2 cmt. g.
226. See, e.g., Patterson v. Cushman, 394 P.2d 657, 658 n.1 (Alaska 1964) (approving
jury instructions that defined negligence as “the want of ordinary care; that is, the want of
such care as an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person would exercise under like
circumstances”); MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMMITTEE, VIRGINIA MODEL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS—Civil 4.000 (2009) (“Negligence is the failure to use ordinary care.
Ordinary care is the care a reasonable person would have used under the circumstances of
this case.”).
227. See generally Heidi Li Feldman, Prudence, Benevolence, and Negligence: Virtue
Ethics and Tort Law, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1431 (2000) (arguing that negligence law’s
reasonable person standard does not require and should not be understood as compelling a
neoclassical economics’ efficiency maximizing actor but includes consideration of broad
virtues including prudence and concern for the safety of others); Lyons, supra note 12
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Learned Hand calculation228 and instructs the jury on the RAD
requirement.229 The test’s exclusive focus on utilitarian concerns
subjects it to the same fundamental criticism Fletcher found
repugnant with the application of the reasonableness paradigm to
negligence-based claims. The RAD test for design defects seeks to
resolve a private dispute between a product manufacturer and an
injured consumer by considering what is most efficient for society
rather than what is just between the parties.230 Where a plaintiff
is injured as the result of a dangerous but socially beneficial
product design, the plaintiff must bear his or her injuries
without compensation.231
Nevertheless, both the autonomy paradigm and the RAD test of
the Third Restatement result in similar outcomes in many design
defect cases involving injury to users and purchasers of products.
Assume, for example, that the plaintiff purchases a compact car and
is injured in a collision when he loses control and strikes a tree.232
Additional safety features would significantly increase the car’s
weight, reduce fuel economy, and increase production costs and the
purchase price.233 Accordingly, although the alternative design is
safer for the driver, the increase in cost and loss in fuel efficiency
could outweigh the improvement in safety under the RAD test.234
Similarly, as long as the risks and benefits of compact cars are
known to consumers, the autonomy paradigm would also deny
compensation under these circumstances. The consumer consents to
the greater risk of the compact car in exchange for the benefits of less
expensive transportation. He may also seek other benefits such as
using fewer scarce resources, producing less pollution, and having
the convenience of a vehicle that is easy to park. Whatever the
perceived benefits, the consumer has received what he considers a
fair exchange of risks for benefits. The risk-benefit exchange was
consented to by the consumer, and liability is not imposed.
Consider another example where both the RAD test and the
autonomy paradigm would impose liability. At night, a young child
(discussing various noneconomic factors the finder of fact should consider in determining
whether a defendant’s conduct was reasonable).
228. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2, cmt. a reporters’ note
(1998) (citing David Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability
Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 754-55 (1996)); see also Twerski, supra note 159, at 31
(“The risk utility test has its origin in the Learned Hand test for negligence.”).
229. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f (1998) (“[P]laintiff
must prove that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced the foreseeable risks
of harm . . . .”).
230. See id.
231. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 542.
232. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. f, illus. 9 (1998).
233. See id.
234. See id.
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trips over the electrical cord of a hot-water vaporizer on her way to
the bathroom.235 As a result, the vaporizer tips over, spilling the hot
water on her and causing serious burns.236 The plaintiff produces
evidence of an alternative vaporizer design in which the water
container is firmly secured to the rest of the unit.237 As long as the
alternative design does not unreasonably increase the cost of the
vaporizer or significantly decrease its utility, the Third Restatement’s
RAD test would impose liability on the manufacturer of the product.238
The autonomy paradigm would also impose liability in the
vaporizer scenario. It does so because of the realities of the consumer
marketplace in which consumers cannot and do not possess the
design expertise of the manufacturer. The same rationales that lead
to the creation of implied warranties of merchantability support
liability under the autonomy paradigm. While the consumer expects
certain risks associated with the use of any product, she also expects
that the manufacturer of the product has employed its superior
expertise and knowledge to create a design that reduces the risk of
the product without impairing its utility or increasing its cost.239 If
the manufacturer fails to do so, the consumer does not receive a fair
exchange of risks for benefits, and liability should be imposed on the
defendant.240 As applied to users and consumers, the RAD test can be
justified by both the reasonableness model and the autonomy model.
Yet something important may have been lost in the change from
the consumer expectation test to the RAD requirement. However
valid the theory behind the RAD test, ultimately the courts and
juries must apply the test to the often complex facts of the case.
Undoubtedly, the algebraic Learned Hand formula appeals to those
who seek to infuse the law with objective scientific principles.241
Imposing liability based upon evidence of a RAD seems to place the law
on a more solid footing than establishing mere consumer expectation.242
However, the factors weighed in the Learned Hand formula are, if
anything, more ethereal and incapable of precise quantification than

235. Id. illus. 6. This illustration is apparently based upon the facts in McCormack v.
Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967).
236. Id.
237. See id. illus. 7.
238. See id.
239. See, e.g., Korzec, supra note 24, at 236 (discussing consumer expectations in terms
of consumer entitlement to safety rather than actual knowledge of the product risks).
240. See id. at 240 (Consumers pay for safety assurance in the product price and are
entitled to receive the benefit of the bargain.).
241. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 571 (discussing the appeal of the
“seemingly precise questions” posed by the Learned Hand formula but suggesting that the
precision is illusionary).
242. Id.
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consumer expectations.243 Judges and jurors typically have no
training in the complex sciences and engineering principles employed
in product designs. As a result, they are largely dependent upon the
testimony of experts retained by the parties to explain the relative
advantages and risks of the existing design and the RAD.244 The
finder of fact is often charged with resolving conflicting expert
testimony but is clearly ill-equipped to do so.245 The degree of utility
provided by both the existing design and the proposed alternative
design is impossible to place into precise values.246 Such analysis
raises polycentric problems because a proposed RAD that reduces the
risk of one hazard may enhance the risk of another hazard.247
The problem is further compounded where the existing product
design creates risks of harm unrelated to the harm that injured the
plaintiff. Evidence of design dangers unrelated to the harm that
caused the plaintiff’s injury are often excluded as not being substantially

243. See Joseph W. Little, The Place of Consumer Expectations in Product Strict
Liability Actions For Defectively Designed Products, 61 TENN. L. REV. 1189, 1192 n.24
(1994) (“Though valuable in analysis involving quantifiable economic costs, it is quickly
rendered into inescapable quagmires of conflicting values when applied in settings
involving non-monetary consequences, such as environmental disputes and disputes over
loss of life and personal injury. Even the most expensive analysis done by experts for
legislative and administrative bodies is highly contentious and difficult. Needless to say,
attempting to perform this analysis in personal injury litigation is neither a productive nor
a useful exercise.”).
244. See John L. Watts, To Tell the Truth: A Qui Tam Action for Perjury in a Civil
Proceeding is Necessary to Protect the Integrity of the Civil Judicial System, 79 TEMP. L.
REV. 773 (2006) (discussing the market incentives for expert witnesses to color their
testimony in favor of the party that retains them and the difficulty of effectively crossexamining expert witnesses).
245. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995) (The
Ninth Circuit openly discussed these difficulties while considering Daubert on remand from
the Supreme Court: “[T]herefore, though we are largely untrained in science and certainly
no match for any of the witnesses whose testimony we are reviewing, it is our
responsibility to determine whether those experts’ proposed testimony amounts to
‘scientific knowledge,’ constitutes ‘good science,’ and was ‘derived by the scientific
method.’ ”); see also Justin P. Murphy, Note, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where Are the
Ethics?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217, 226, 236, 239 (2000) (discussing difficulties
confronting courts and lawyers in evaluating expert testimony and proposing creation of
permanent organization to provide courts with experts to assist them in their gatekeeping
function); Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L. J. 353, 388 (1988) (questioning the ability of juries to evaluate the utility of
product designs).
246. See Murphy, supra note 245; Schwartz, supra note 245 (questioning the ability of
juries to evaluate the utility of product designs).
247. James A. Henderson, Jr., Judicial Review of Manufacturers’ Conscious Design
Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1550-52 (1973) (noting that
design choices involve polycentric problems which courts are institutionally ill-equipped to
evaluate); Kysar, supra note 24, at 1740 (discussing research that suggests that the riskutility calculus implemented by the RAD test of the Third Restatement is misconceived);
see also Bernier v. Boston Edison Co., 403 N.E.2d 391, 397 (Mass. 1980) (providing an
example of a polycentric design issue).
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similar to the case under consideration.248 Even if the trier of fact can
determine the relative safety and utility of the challenged design as
compared to the RAD, how is this balanced against the harm? As the
courts have recognized, the value of compensation for harm is left to
the discretion and wisdom of jurors and can vary widely from case to
case.249 There simply are no tools to measure a pound of pain and no
market in which to determine its value.250
In fact, if the finder of fact could reliably, precisely, and accurately
evaluate RADs, verdicts in design defect claims would result in
injunctive relief in addition to compensatory damages. Once it has
been established, from a utilitarian perspective, that the existing
product design is inferior to the RAD, what justification is there for
allowing the defective design to continue to be produced? If the RAD
test is thought to be reliable, the law should compel product
modification or enjoin production of the existing design. The failure
to do so suggests a lack of confidence in the competence of jurors to
correctly select the design that will best enhance safety while
retaining the product utility. Jurors are not generally engineers,
scientists, or economists and cannot be expected to fully understand
the complex factors they must balance in the risk-utility reasonably
alternative design analysis. Jurors are, however, ordinary consumers
that have an innate understanding of what consumers expect in
terms of a fair exchange.251
248. Generally, courts only allow evidence of prior accidents where the facts and
circumstances of the prior accidents are substantially similar to the plaintiff’s accidents.
See generally OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 6.4. This substantial similarity
inquiry is often quite narrow. Id. However, if the reason the prior accident evidence is
introduced is to establish that the RAD results in a safer product, all prior accidents that
could have been prevented by the plaintiff’s RAD should be admitted even if not similar in
other respects to the plaintiff’s accident.
249. See, e.g., Richmond Ry. & Elec. Co. v. Garthright, 24 S.E. 267, 269 (Va. 1896) (“No
method has yet been devised, nor scales adjusted, by which to measure or weigh and value
in money the degrees of pain and anguish of a suffering human being, nor ever likely to be;
and we cannot say, upon the evidence in this case, that $1,000 was excessive damages. It
was not so great, considering the injuries proved to have been sustained by the plaintiff, as
to furnish ground for believing that the jury were actuated by partiality or prejudice; and,
unless this is the case, under the well-settled rule in this state, the court should not disturb
the verdict.”).
250. The problem is particularly complex and indefinite in cases where the victim is
killed. Wrongful death claims do not compensate the decedent for his loss of life. Rather,
they only permit the decedent’s beneficiaries to recover for the loss of services and certain
pecuniary losses resulting from the death of the decedent. Some also allow for
compensation for the grief of the decedent’s beneficiaries. Such monetary compensation, for
example, damages awarded for the parents grief over the loss of an only child, is hardly
capable of providing useful numbers for performing the risk-utility analysis contemplated
by the algebraic formula. Even if monetary compensation for the grief of the parent was
the equivalent of the value of the child to the parent, the deceased child’s loss of a full life
and all it encompasses—the struggles, achievements, and innumerable pleasures—is all
left unaccounted for in the analysis. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 298
(2000) (discussing the availability of nonpecuniary damages in wrongful death cases).
251. Note, supra note 24.
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VI. BYSTANDER LIABILITY
Where the RAD test most clearly conflicts with the autonomy
paradigm is when the injured party is a bystander rather than a user
or consumer of the product. Bystanders injured by product designs
stand in a distinctively different position from consumers.252 They
have no opportunity to evaluate the product, consider the reputation
of the manufacturer, read the warnings, consider the risks, or enjoy
the product’s benefits.253 When a bystander is harmed by a danger
inherent in the product design, it cannot be fairly said that he or she
has consented to the risks an ordinary consumer expects to
accompany the product.254 More importantly, a bystander has not
received the product’s benefits that the users and consumers receive
in exchange for the risks they confront in product use.255 As a result,
Fletcher’s nonreciprocal risk test works well with regard to
bystanders because there is no bargained-for relationship between
the manufacturer and the bystander injured by an inherent risk of
the product.256 Yet the Third Restatement’s RAD test treats the
relationship between the product and plaintiff as irrelevant.
The tenacity with which courts adhered to the privity
requirement, even in negligence-based product liability claims,
resulted in part from a recognition that those involved in the
selection and purchase of products are different from the rest of the
world that comes in contact with the product. With the shift from
contract to tort liability, it would have made more sense to first apply
tort law to those not in privity, rather than those who purchased the
product.257 Indeed, several cases258 and scholarly commentators noted
252. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., “Good Whiskey,” Drunk Driving, and Innocent Bystanders:
The Responsibility of Manufacturers of Alcohol and Other Dangerous Hedonic Products for
Bystander Injury, 45 S.C. L. REV. 269, 273 (1994) [hereinafter Cochran, Good Whiskey];
Note, Strict Products Liability to the Bystander: A Study in Common Law Determinism, 38
U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 642 (1971); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Dangerous Products and
Injured Bystanders, 81 KY. L.J. 687, 695 (1993) [hereinafter Cochran, Dangerous Products].
253. Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 688; see also Cochran, Good
Whiskey, supra note 252, at 273; Note, supra note 252, at 642.
254. See Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 693; Cochran, Good Whiskey,
supra note 252, at 283.
255. Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 704-05.
256. See id. at 701-02; Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 284-85.
257. See Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the Economic Loss Rule,
66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 523, 553 (2009) (noting that respect for contract principles does
not require the application of the economic loss rule bar to third parties not in privity of
contract and discussing cases so holding).
258. See, e.g., Elmore v. Am. Motors Corp., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969). In Elmore, the
plaintiff was injured when the drive shaft of a 1962 Rambler American station wagon
dropped to the pavement causing the vehicle to swerve into the oncoming lane of traffic
and collide with the plaintiff’s vehicle. Id. at 85. The court reversed the trial court’s
dismissal of the plaintiff’s strict liability claim, holding that bystanders may maintain a
cause of action on the same terms as users and consumers. Id. at 89. The court observed
that the policy rationale justifying strict liability applies to bystanders as well as users and
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that bystanders injured by a defective product were, from a fairness
perspective, more deserving of recovery than were those who
purchased or used the product and had an opportunity to inspect for
defects and select a product for its benefits, including a competitive
price perhaps made possible only because of cost-saving measures
that increased product risks.259 Despite the awareness of the
important distinction between consumers and bystanders, the fall of
privity resulted in a complete disregard of the relationship between
the injured party and the product. This failure to distinguish
between consumers and bystanders has remained because of the
exclusive focus on fault rather than fairness in the determination
of liability.
Although the Restatement (Second) of Torts took no position as to
whether § 402A should apply to claims by persons other than users
or consumers,260 almost all jurisdictions that considered the issue did
apply it to injured bystanders.261 By its own terms, the consumer
expectation test is ill-suited to bystander claims. After all, what
expectation does the nonconsumer have regarding the product?262
Nevertheless, a separate test for liability to bystanders injured by
defective products is unnecessary in the case of manufacturing
defects because the consumer never expected that the product would
deviate from the manufacturer’s design. Whenever a consumer or
bystander was injured as a result of a manufacturing defect, liability
was imposed. But when the injury is the result of a design defect, it
seems ridiculous to analyze the bystander’s claims in terms of
disappointed consumer expectations.263 The purchaser implicitly or
expressly consents to certain design hazards in exchange for the
benefits provided by the product’s design in terms of costs or utility.
On the other hand, the bystander had no expectations regarding the
product he neither purchased nor used.264 Nevertheless, courts

consumers. Id. It characterized the restrictions on bystander recovery as an unjustified
vestige of the privity requirement and stated that “bystanders should be entitled to greater
protection than the consumer or user” who may inspect for defect and purchase selectively.
Id. (emphasis added).
259. Note, supra note 252, at 642; see also Bohlen, supra note 120, at 354-55; Cochran,
Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 693; Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 273.
260. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Caveat (1) (1966).
261. Howard Latin & Bobby Kasolas, Bad Designs, Lethal Profits: The Duty to Protect
Other Motorists Against SUV Collision Risks, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1161, 1174 (2002) (noting the
uniform application of § 402A to claims against automobile manufacturers brought by
bystanders including motorists in other vehicles and citing cases).
262. See Ewen v. McLean Trucking Co., 706 P.2d 929, 935 (Or. 1985) (interpreting an
Oregon statute based upon § 402A’s consumer expectation test and holding that a
pedestrian struck by a truck was not a consumer whose expectations could be considered in
determining if the truck was defective).
263. Davis, supra note 153, at 1236-37.
264. Id. at 1236.
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applied the same consumer expectation test to bystanders’ claims of
design defect.265
In one respect, the Restatement (Third) on Torts: Products
Liability improved upon the Second Restatement by broadly covering
harms to “persons or property”266 rather than the more limited
“user[s and] consumer[s]” of § 402A.267 Accordingly, bystanders
injured by a defective product are expressly covered by the Third
Restatement.268 But the shift from the nebulous consumer expectation
test to the risk-utility RAD test actually exacerbated the unfairness
of applying a single test for liability to consumers and bystanders.
The ill-defined consumer expectation test left room for jurors’
intuitive notions of fairness to creep in and influence their verdict
where the injured party was a stranger to the product. The more
precisely defined risk-utility RAD test simply leaves no room for
consideration of the plaintiff’s relationship to the product. The RAD
test, based upon utilitarian principles, logically applies to both
consumers and bystanders injured by product designs. The test
regards the relationship between product and plaintiff as irrelevant
because its goal is to maximize social welfare.
While numerous commentators have noted the unique
circumstances of bystanders, Professor Robert Cochran, Jr. has been
the sole voice proposing a products liability rule that provides
compensation for losses resulting from the nonreciprocal nature of
the risks certain products impose on those who neither use nor
purchase them.269 He suggests that injured bystanders should not
have to prove product defect in order to recover when they have
established the following: “1) the product is dangerous; 2) the product
is an hedonic product, that is, that it is primarily used for purposes of
entertainment and enjoyment; and 3) the plaintiff was a bystander,
i.e., one whom the product did not benefit.”270 Professor Cochran
primarily discusses his novel cause of action as applied to alcoholrelated accidents that injure nondrinkers.271 Intoxicated drivers
impose nonreciprocal risks on other drivers and pedestrians. Cochran
makes a compelling argument that the costs of these harms should be
265. Since the consumer expectation test is an objective test, the same test can be
applied even if sound reasons justify a more liberal test for liability. See Note, supra note
252, at 627-35 (discussing early cases applying the consumer expectation test to bystanders
without considering the implications).
266. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (1998).
267. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
268. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 cmt. d (1998).
269. See Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 285.
270. Id. at 274.
271. See id. at 275-86. Cochran also applied his rule to secondhand tobacco smoke and
firearms and suggested it could apply to other products like pleasure boats. Robert F.
Cochran, Jr., From Cigarettes to Alcohol: The Next Step in Hedonic Product Liability?, 27
PEPP. L. REV. 701, 711 (2000).
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spread among alcohol consumers rather than the injured bystanders.
Cochran also applies his rule to secondhand smoke and firearms.
Although Cochran relies upon Fletcher’s paradigm of reciprocity,
it is not clear why bystanders injured by hedonistic products are
more deserving of compensation than bystanders injured by
dangerous products with more functional utility.272 Cochran
acknowledges that hedonistic products are important but insists they
are not as important as other, more essential products.273
Fundamentally, this distinction just favors one form of utility over
another. The bystander injured by the inherent dangers of forklifts,
tractor-trailers, or asbestos seems just as deserving of compensation
as bystanders injured by firearms, alcohol, or secondhand smoke. In
either case, the bystander is sacrificed as a means to achieve the
goals of the product’s consumer.
In fact, the greater the product’s utility, the greater its capacity to
absorb the costs of injuries to bystanders. As the price of the product
increases, products with less utility will price themselves out of the
market. Wealthy consumers of hedonistic products may continue to
purchase them while less affluent consumers will have to forgo the
pleasures of these products. In the case of products with more
functional utility, they will continue to be consumed to the extent
that they can pay their own way. Products with the greatest utility,
particularly commercial products, will certainly continue to be
consumed because they will enhance the profits of commercial
enterprises despite their costs.
However, most of the injuries to bystanders caused by dangerous
products like alcohol and firearms are the result of superseding
intentional acts of consumers.274 Traditional proximate cause
doctrines preclude the imposition of even strict liability for
intervening intentional criminal acts. Drunk driving and firearm
violence are already prohibited by criminal laws. To impose liability
on the manufacturers of these products, in the absence of
contributing fault on their part, would require a dramatic shift in
proximate cause analysis.275

272. It is not clear how to distinguish hedonistic products from nonhedonistic products.
Many products are utilized for both entertainment and enjoyment as well as for less
pleasurable purposes. Firearms have tremendous utility for self-defense, but they are also
used for pleasure. Many, if not most, consumers utilize their automobiles for both
pleasurable and purely functional purposes. Should liability be imposed when a bystander
is injured while on a Sunday drive but not when on the way to an early shift at the factory?
273. Cochran, Good Whiskey, supra note 252, at 279-80.
274. See DOBBS, supra note 250, §§ 190, 195.
275. Conversely, many commercial products cause injuries to bystanders even when
the consumer is not acting as a superseding intentional tortfeasor. As a result, a
traditional proximate cause analysis would not hinder application of strict liability for
these claims.
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While the autonomy paradigm may not justify Cochran’s
distinction between hedonistic and nonhedonistic products, his
analysis of the distinction between consumers and bystanders is
compelling. The question remains: When should bystanders be
entitled to compensation even where no RAD is available? The most
sweeping possibility is to impose strict liability against
manufacturers for injuries to bystanders proximately caused by the
inherent risks of their products. At first blush, the suggestion seems
to tip the scales too far on the side of individual autonomy at the cost
of utility. Yet enterprise liability has long explained that such a rule
would not adversely impact the availability of socially useful but
dangerous products. Even where liability is imposed, the
manufacturer is not prohibited from continued use of the current
design. The manufacturer simply compensates injured parties for
their loss and can spread those costs among purchasers who benefit
from the product’s utility. If the product is sufficiently useful,
consumers will pay the high price and absorb the costs of the harm to
nonusers. Strict liability, imposing compensatory damages rather
than punitive damages or injunctive relief, should not restrict the
supply of products that have social utility.276
However, the autonomy paradigm does not require strict liability
for all injuries to bystanders caused by product designs. Such
sweeping application is neither fair nor practical. Certain inherent
dangers of commonly used products impose roughly reciprocal risks
on all members of society. The dangers from commonly used products
may be properly regarded as background risks that must be borne by
all as the cost of community living in the same way that the
background risks of other common activities must be borne by all
members of society.277 When a bystander is injured by risks inherent
in the design of a widely consumed product, it is fair to require that
the plaintiff establish that the design was not reasonably safe rather
than impose strict liability.
For example, all motor vehicles, as designed, create inherent risks
as large, heavy, and fast-moving machines. Of course, if the
pedestrian is a driver some of the time, he has implicitly consented to
the risks associated with typical vehicle uses and imposes similar
risks on other pedestrians when driving. The driver also benefits
from the utility of motor vehicles as a class. Under such
276. Of course, this also fosters freedom in that it allows producers and consumers to
have access to products they desire regardless of the dangers to themselves and others
provided they are willing to pay the increased product price as a result of tort claims. The
legislature, rather than the court, could step in and prohibit the production of products
deemed to cause too much harm to bystanders despite the demand of consumers. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 cmt. d (suggesting the same with
regard to “widely used and consumed, but nevertheless dangerous, products”).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 94-98.
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circumstances it does not seem unfair to say that he has consented to
the typical background risks of motor vehicle designs. On the other
hand, where the plaintiff is injured by a specific motor vehicle design
that is not reasonably safe as compared to a RAD, recovery is
permitted under the Third Restatement.
In some contexts, however, we may be able to determine that the
dangers inherent in the design of a particular product create risks to
bystanders grossly disproportionate to commonly used products such
that strict liability should be imposed for injuries to bystanders. The
designs of Sport Utility Vehicles (SUVs), for example, impose risks on
pedestrians and occupants of passenger cars vastly exceeding the
risks imposed even by cars of similar weight.278 The dangers are most
pronounced with the largest, heaviest, and highest-riding SUVs, such
as the Ford Excursion, Hummer, and Chevrolet Suburban.279 The
height differential between these SUVs and passenger cars results in
the frame and protective structures of the SUVs overriding the frame
and protective structures on the cars, resulting in massive damage to
the passenger compartments.280 Arguably, these vehicles may be
defectively designed from a risk-utility, RAD analysis, as most of
these SUVs are used exclusively for highway use.281 But there may be
no RAD that would eliminate the nonreciprocal risks of these
vehicles where they are used both for off-road and highway use.282
Yet the benefits enjoyed by these vehicle owners are not shared by
the injured bystander who suffers injury proximately caused by the
design’s risks. The autonomy paradigm would justify the imposition
of liability without fault under these circumstances.
There undoubtedly are other consumer products that create clear
hazards to bystanders that are greater than the risks of other, more
commonly utilized designs. When a bystander is injured as a result of
the danger created by these design characteristics, it is appropriate
to impose liability on the product manufacturer in order to
compensate that victim and ensure that the consumers who benefit
from the product’s utility pay for the harm that they cause. This
could be done on a case-by-case basis, as in the SUV example above.
The plaintiff would bear the burden of proving that the product
278. See Kevin Case, Tanks in the Streets: SUVs, Design Defects, and Ultrahazardous
Strict Liability, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 149, 149-50 (2006); Latin & Kasolas, supra note 261,
at 1162 (citing a National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration study that found
that midsize SUVs were three times as likely to kill other motorists in a collision as
passenger cars of approximately the same weight).
279. Latin & Kasolas, supra note 261, at 1212.
280. Id. at 1201-02.
281. See id. at 1216 (suggesting numerous alternative designs that would reduce the
risks of override and urging the imposition of liability for injuries to bystanders under
traditional defective design analysis).
282. But see id. (dismissing this argument primarily because the industry is aware that
only a very small percentage of consumers truly drive off-road).
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design creates risks greater than the normal background risks of
typical product use as well as the plaintiff’s own product use.283 As in
all tort claims, the plaintiff would also have to establish that the
product design hazard was the cause-in-fact and the proximate cause
of his injury. The fact that no RAD is available would not defeat
liability. The focus would be on the disproportionate distribution
of the risk compared to the benefits, not the unreasonableness of
the design.
In order to limit liability to cases of clearly nonreciprocal risk
imposition, it may be necessary to require that the plaintiff establish
that the dangers to bystanders are vastly greater than background
risks of typical product use. A razor’s edge analysis, where strict
liability is imposed whenever the challenged design is slightly more
dangerous to bystanders than the background risks of typical product
design, would result in excessive litigation, undesirable transaction
costs, and arbitrary outcomes.284 This could be avoided by requiring
clear and convincing proof of significantly greater risks than the
background risks created by normal product consumption.
In addition to, or as an alternative to, a case-by-case analysis, the
autonomy paradigm justifies the imposition of strict liability for
injured bystanders for two categories of products. First, strict
liability should be imposed upon manufacturers for injuries to
bystanders caused by abnormally dangerous products. A second,
broader proposal imposes strict liability on manufacturers of
commercial products for injuries to bystanders caused by the
inherent risks of their products. In both instances, the products
create nonreciprocal risks to bystanders without conveying any direct
benefits on injured bystanders.
A. Abnormally Dangerous Products
Professor John L. Diamond has suggested that traditional strict
liability should be imposed upon manufacturers of abnormally
dangerous products for the same reason that strict liability is
imposed upon those who conduct abnormally dangerous activities.285
Professor Diamond’s proposal, like Fletcher’s reciprocity paradigm,
focuses on the foreseeable and unilateral nature of the risk rather
283. For example, if both the plaintiff and the defendant drove SUVs, it would not be
fair to impose strict liability because the plaintiff also benefitted from the utility of the
product design, even if not driving an SUV at the time of the injury.
284. See Keating, Reasonableness, supra note 22, at 330. Keating uses the term “razor’s
edge” in a similar way when criticizing Judge Posner’s interpretation of the Learned Hand
negligence formula. Id. In Keating’s view, Posner divides liability along a razor’s edge,
“allowing a penny’s difference either way to tip the balance for or against a finding of
negligence.” Id.
285. John L. Diamond, Eliminating the “Defect” in Design Strict Products Liability
Theory, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 531 (1983).
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than the reasonableness of the risk.286 The manufacture and use of
products like dynamite are reasonable from a utilitarian analysis;
they simply create an unusually high risk of harm. The manufacturer
of products used in abnormally dangerous activities benefits from the
unavoidable risks to others created by its products.287 Therefore, it is
not unfair to require the manufacturers of the product, as well as the
users, to compensate those inevitably injured by the product’s
inherent risks. The manufacturer is in an ideal position to spread the
cost of the injuries to all those who directly benefit from the product’s
use, and imposing liability would encourage the manufacturer to
distribute its product only to responsible users.288 In other words, the
question is not whether the product design is defective but, in
fairness, whether the manufacturer should pay for the foreseeable
harm caused by its product.289
However, Diamond’s proposal, like the Third Restatement, makes
no distinction between consumers and bystanders injured by
abnormally dangerous products.290 Therefore, he ignores the users’
and consumers’ express or implicit consent to product risks in
exchange for the benefits of the abnormally dangerous product’s
utility. The benefits enjoyed by purchasers and consumers of these
useful but dangerous products justify requiring them to establish the
product design was defective by providing evidence of a RAD before
the manufacturer must compensate them for their injuries.
It is necessary here to further define who is a bystander. The
rationale for imposing strict liability is the injustice of suffering
injury from risks deemed reasonable from a social utility costbenefits analysis, but from which the plaintiff does not directly
receive the benefits of the product’s efficiency. Clearly, individual
users and consumers implicitly consent to the risks of the products in
exchange for the benefits such that liability should only be imposed
under existing theories of recovery. The problem of determining who
is the user or consumer of the product becomes more complex in the
cases of business entities. Should employees of corporate consumers
be deemed consumers or bystanders?
For a number of reasons, employees of corporations injured by
products selected by their employer should not be treated as
bystanders. First, they benefit from the utility of the abnormally
dangerous product. They receive a salary and other benefits for their
participation in an enterprise which, in turn, directly benefits from
286. Id. at 547-49.
287. Id. at 548.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Although Professor Diamond seeks to impose strict liability on manufacturers of
abnormally dangerous products, he does not limit strict liability to bystanders. See id. at 550.
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the use of the dangerous product.291 They have, at least implicitly,
consented to the risk by choosing to work with the dangerous
product. Finally, in the event that they are injured, they are partially
compensated for their injuries under existing workers’ compensation
schemes.292 Therefore, unlike the true strangers to the product, they
are not left to bear all the cost of the socially beneficial activity.293
On the other hand, bystanders injured by abnormally dangerous
products are exposed to nonreciprocal risks while not receiving any
direct benefits in exchange for the product’s utility. As the term
implies, abnormally dangerous products cannot be considered
background risks that are associated with common consumer
products. Imposing traditional strict liability upon manufacturers
for bystanders injured by abnormally dangerous products like
pesticides, explosives, toxic materials, and radioactive material would
provide a clear, fair, and efficient exception to the RAD test of the
Third Restatement.
B. Commercial Products
The autonomy paradigm justifies an even broader categorical
distinction for the application of strict liability for injuries to
bystanders. Strict liability could be imposed for all injuries to

291. See Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1295. For similar reasons, Keating
questions the fairness of providing employees the benefits of strict liability through
workers’ compensation, while allowing strangers to the enterprise to recover only upon a
showing of fault. Id. Enterprise liability holds that those who benefit from the enterprise
should bear the costs of the harms it creates. Id. Employees benefit from the enterprise and
voluntarily participate in it; strangers do not. Id.
292. These rationales also justify workers’ compensation schemes’ failure to provide
full tort damages including compensation for pain and suffering. The employee has
benefited from the activity and has consented, at least on one level, to the risks where the
bystander has not.
293. The same rationale supports a distinction between civilians and military servicemembers in the application of the government contractor defense. The “government
contractor defense” bars state law design defect claims by any injured person against
government equipment manufacturers, provided that the design conformed to reasonably
precise specifications approved by the United States. Unlike military members, civilians
are not compensated though any military benefits or veterans’ benefits. In addition,
civilians do not voluntarily agree to assume the risks of military activities as do the
members of our all-volunteer military. The United States does not currently draft military
members. Everyone in the military has volunteered to serve and presumably understands
the risks associated with military service. In the absence of a civil suit, civilians may be left
without any compensation for their injuries. While we all enjoy the benefits of our nation’s
military superiority, the government contractor defense currently forces the injured
civilian to bear a grossly disproportionate share of the costs of equipping the military.
Allowing civilian suits might increase the cost of military equipment purchased by the
government, but fairness requires that all taxpayers shoulder this burden, rather than the
unfortunate injured civilian. See generally John L. Watts, Differences Without Distinctions:
Boyle’s Government Contractor Defense Fails to Recognize the Critical Differences Between
Civilian and Military Plaintiffs and Between Military and Non-Military Procurement, 60
OKLA. L. REV. 647 (2007).
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bystanders proximately caused by the inherent risks of commercial
products while bystanders injured by the inherent risks of consumer
products would have to recover under the Third Restatement’s RAD
test. There are several rationales behind this distinction between
consumer products and commercial products.
First, all persons use consumer products, while commercial
products are used typically only by commercial enterprises. Although
some consumer products produce greater risks to bystanders than
others, all individual consumers subject bystanders to some risks
associated with their product consumption.294 As a class, consumer
products could fairly be regarded as background risks created by all
and borne by all without compensation in the absence of fault as a
cost of collective living.295 To the extent that a particular consumer
product creates risks substantially greater than the typical risks of
nearly universally consumed products, strict liability could be
imposed on a case-by-case basis, as with the SUV example above.
Second, the distinction between commercial and consumer
products is already recognized in products liability law and has
proven to be a workable distinction that the courts can apply. The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act distinguishes between consumer
products and commercial products and defines consumer products as
those that are “normally used for personal, family, or household
purposes.”296 This definition is nicely suited to identifying background
risks because it focuses on the nature of the product’s principle use
rather than the specific purchaser’s intended use of the product.297
The use of a typical passenger car by a commercial enterprise creates
no risks for bystanders distinguishable from ordinary consumer use.
However, regardless of whether a commercial product is used by a

294. For the reasons previously discussed, it would be impractical to fairly compare the
risk of the users of one product against the user of the other. While the compact car driver
may create less risk to the driver of the SUV in the event of a collision, the compact car
driver assumed the risk of driving a small vehicle in exchange for the cost savings both in
terms of initial purchase price and fuel savings. Yet the SUV might be less likely to be
involved in an accident in the first instance because of its visibility to others and the high
vantage point of its operator.
295. See Note, supra note 252, at 638-39. In discussing the application of strict liability
to bystanders, the author made a similar point in responding to claims that compensating
bystanders gives them a free ride at the cost of consumers: “Bystanders as a class purchase
most of the same products to which they are exposed as bystanders. Thus as a class they
indirectly subsidize the manufacturer’s liability and in this sense do pay for the insurance
policy tied to the product.” Id.
296. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (2006).
297. Compare U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c) (2008) (distinguishing between consumer and
commercial goods and stating that “ ‘[c]onsumer’ means an individual who buys or
contracts to buy goods that, at the time of contracting, are intended by the individual to be
used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes”), with 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1)
(focusing on the nature of the product’s principle use instead of the purchaser’s intended
use of the product at the time of purchase).
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business entity or an individual, the risks cannot be regarded as one
created by all and fairly borne by all.
Utilitarian rationales supporting the distinction between
consumer and commercial products in the Magnuson-Moss Warranty
Act also support that distinction when imposing strict liability for
injured bystanders. For consumer products, the Act nullifies
warranty disclaimers in many instances notwithstanding contrary
state law.298 On the other hand, commercial product sellers are
allowed to disclaim warranties because the commercial product
purchasers are thought to be better equipped to bargain for the
allocation of risk. The Act permits commercial entities to waive
warranty protection for two reasons. First, commercial product
transactions typically involve large expenditures, either because of
the quantity or because the product is itself expensive, even in
comparison to costly consumer products.299 As a result, the
commercial product purchaser may devote substantial resources into
evaluation of product risks and utility that consumers typically do
not.300 Large purchases also mean that commercial product
purchasers are in a better bargaining position with the manufacturer
regarding the design of the product and the warranty provided.301
Moreover, commercial product consumers can negotiate for contractual
contribution and indemnification provisions that are not possible in
the typical consumer product transaction.302 Unlike commercial
enterprises, consumer product purchasers are typically poorly
informed as to the product’s design characteristics.303 The cost of most
consumer products does not justify the time and effort required to
evaluate the relative risks and utility of specific product designs.304
298. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (2006). The Uniform Commercial Code also defines consumer goods
as goods “used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” U.C.C. § 2-103(1)(c).
299. Peter M. Kinkaid & William J. Stuntz, Enforcing Waivers in Products Liability, 69
VA. L. REV. 1111, 1150 n.162 (1983).
300. Id.
301. A similar rationale has been used to bar design defect claims brought against
government contractors where the government approved reasonably precise design
specifications. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 512 (1988). The contractor
shares the government’s immunity from suit under the discretionary function exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006), because the design was selected,
or at least approved, by the government. See id. at 211-12.
302. See Mark Geistfeld, Imperfect Information, the Pricing Mechanism, and Products
Liability, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1057, 1071 (1988); Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299.
303. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); OWEN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 126, § 5.4; Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1286;
Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299; see generally James A. Henderson, Jr. & Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, Product-Related Risk and Cognitive Biases: The Shortcomings of Enterprise
Liability, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 213, 220-24 (2000) (discussing how manufacturer
manipulation of consumers through advertising leads to consumers both underestimating
and overestimating risk).
304. Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299; see also Landes & Posner, supra note 140, at
536 (consumers do not have perfect information because of the cost of obtaining it).
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Therefore, purchasers of consumer products simply do not have the
bargaining power that commercial product consumers enjoy.305
Second, corporations and other commercial entities do not face the
risk of bodily injury that directly confronts individual consumer
product purchasers.306 Employees may bleed, break bones, or develop
cancer, but these harms are felt by the corporation only in terms of
costs or lost productivity. Commercial entities view the risks of a
product in purely economic terms and treat them no differently from
other costs of doing business.307 As a result, commercial product users
are less likely to either underestimate or overvalue the risks and
benefits from an efficiency perspective. In other words, they are
better able to determine whether the purchaser or the manufacturer
should bear the risk of warranty waiver.308 Conversely, consumer
product purchasers are notoriously irrational risk evaluators.309
Unlike commercial entities, consumers are unlikely to regard
personal injuries as just another cost. They often overestimate the
probability of serious, but unlikely, risks. Other consumers
overestimate their ability to avoid product risks; they assume that
the injury won’t happen to them.310 As a result, imposing strict liability
as to consumer products may not result in efficiency or safety.311
Accordingly, the basic rationales supporting enterprise liability
also support the imposition of strict liability on the commercial
product manufacturer for injuries to bystanders. First, fairness
requires that the costs of accidents related to commercial enterprises
should be borne by those that profit from the injury-causing
activities.312 Second, enterprise liability would allow the marketplace
305. See Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299, at 1152.
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 1150 n.162.
309. See id. But see Landes & Posner, supra note 140, at 536-37 (performing an
economic analysis of products liability but refusing to “assume that consumers have
psychological traits that cause them to misperceive risks systematically”).
310. See Kinkaid & Stuntz, supra note 299, at 1151 n.162; see also Henderson &
Rachlinski, supra note 303; Kysar, supra note 24 (discussing how cognitive errors,
irrationality, and perhaps an alternative rationality of consumers impacts their
evaluations of product risks and benefits in ways not accounted for by the Third
Restatement’s test).
311. Where a consumer product creates simply too much risk to bystanders, the state
legislatures should prohibit the product’s distribution rather than merely awarding
compensation. Monetary compensation is an imperfect remedy for someone who has
suffered a serious loss of autonomy, due to physical injury, where the product does not
advance important collective welfare objectives.
312. This is one of the fundamental rationales behind vicarious liability and
Workmen’s Compensation Acts. Yet, from a pure enterprise liability perspective,
respondeat superior liability should not be limited to injuries caused by the “fault” of
servants. Moreover, bystanders injured by the enterprise are more deserving of
compensation than workers who have voluntarily participated in the enterprise and
directly benefited from it. Keating, Theory, supra note 12, at 1295.
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to determine which activities’ benefits are sufficient to justify the
harms. If the enterprise can pay for the injuries it causes and still
remain profitable, it must produce benefits that outweigh its costs
(including injuries to bystanders).313 Because both the manufacturers
of commercial products and the purchasers of these products are
commercial entities, the decisions of both are motivated by financial
concerns. Commercial product manufacturers and commercial
product consumers will only seek to reduce harms if they must
absorb the costs of injuries. Accordingly, they should be required to
pay for the harm to innocent bystanders caused by their products.314
These costs, when considered by commercial profit-maximizing
rational actors, will not result in a loss of utility but will result in a
more accurate market determination of efficiency.315 If the product’s
utility does outweigh the risks, manufacturers can compensate
bystanders injured by the product’s dangers and distribute the costs
to those that purchase the products and benefit from the utility of the
design features that harmed the plaintiff. On the other hand, the
internalization of cost associated with product harms to bystanders
will cause commercial product purchasers to demand safer products
when the costs do not outweigh the product’s utility.
Finally, the distinction between consumer and commercial goods
furthers individual liberty to freely engage in consumer product
consumption and provides a workable system for the courts and
parties to apply. We all engage in the consumption of products that
impose risks on bystanders, and we all enjoy the benefits of these
products. In theory, individual autonomy could be protected by
imposing liability whenever the product that causes harm to the
bystander is not a class of products that the bystander also utilizes.
Such a rule, however, would result in prohibitive litigation and seems
unnecessary provided that the bystander exposes others to roughly
similar risks through the products he or she uses.316 The distinction
between commercial products and consumer products will allow for
predictability among manufacturers regarding which products will
expose them to strict liability for bystander injuries, without endless,
expensive, and in some cases, impossible factual inquires.
VII. CONCLUSION
Tort law has long struggled with finding the proper balance
between protecting individual rights and furthering social utility.
The deontological approach of emphasizing the intrinsic worth of a
313. Cochran, Dangerous Products, supra note 252, at 697-98.
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. See Fletcher, Fairness and Utility, supra note 13, at 572 (noting the difficulty in
comparing the risks of common yet diverse activities).
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particular action is fundamentally incompatible with the
consequentialist perspective of judging an action by whether it
creates the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Like
purebred show dogs, these two approaches function best in artificial,
controlled conditions—such as the hypotheticals presented by their
proponents. In practice, however, each approach, emphasized to the
exclusion of the other, leads to undesirable results. In the real world,
the law has long sought to combine their most useful traits and
eliminate or counteract their weaknesses.
Numerous scholars have been critical of the Third Restatement’s
abandonment of the consumer expectation test as a retreat from the
individual fairness goals of strict product liability.317 Yet, to
paraphrase Marc Antony from Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, I have
come to praise the Third Restatement, not to bury it.318 Careful
analysis through the application of the autonomy paradigm and the
reasonableness paradigm demonstrates that, in most respects, the
Third Restatement strikes both a fair and reasonable balance
between individual justice and social utility. It is only in its
application of the reasonable alternative design test to bystanders
that the scales of justice have been unfairly tipped in favor of utility.
Commenting upon the development of the Third Restatement,
Professor Henderson noted that twenty years from now lawyers will
look back and wonder how we could have missed some issue that
seems obvious in hindsight.319 Viewed through the autonomy paradigm,
the Third Restatement’s failure to provide a distinct category of strict
liability for bystanders injured by inherent risks of abnormally
dangerous and commercial products is that obvious oversight.
This Article identifies areas where fairness demands that strict
liability be imposed. There is room for experimentation among the
fifty jurisdictions applying product liability law so that, over time,
the laboratories of democracy might settle on the best option.320 The
current reasonable alternative design test, as applied to inherently
dangerous but useful product designs, simply exacts too high a price
on injured bystanders for the sake of efficiency and utility. Injured
317. See sources cited supra note 24.
318. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 3, sc. 2. After Caesar’s murder at the
hand of Brutus, Mark Antony addresses the crowed with the famous line: “Friends,
Romans, countrymen, . . . I [have] come to bury Caesar, not . . . praise him.” Id. Antony
then extorts a long list of Caesar’s most positive qualities. See id.
319. James A. Henderson Jr., A Discussion and a Defense of the Restatement (Third) of
Torts: Products Liability, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 18, 21 (1998).
320. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.
dissenting) (cautioning against the use of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause
as a tool for second guessing legislative efforts at economic regulations). “It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk
to the rest of the country.” Id.
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bystanders must not be used as a means to achieve a socially
beneficial end. Torts suits are private disputes involving real
individuals who have suffered real harms. If courts are to remain
courts of justice and not simply engines for efficiency, they must
weigh the relationship of the injured party to the product when
determining liability.

